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Abstract 
The concept of health security has been gaining prominence since the 1990s due to a renewed 
awareness of emerging and re-emerging infectious diseases. The intersection between health, states 
and security is, however, a contested one. The central question raised by critics of the health 
security agenda is focused on the meaning and implications of the concept; specifically the aims, 
methods and values of health security. These questions boil down to “security for whom and 
security from what?” The answer many scholars come to is that global health security is concerned 
with the containment of potentially serious and rapidly spreading infectious diseases, and with 
disease surveillance. The point is made that the strengthening of surveillance for infectious diseases 
brings little benefit to any country which lacks the public health infrastructure necessary for an 
effective response. Health security is thus geared more towards outbreak containment rather than 
disease prevention. What this means is that global health security mechanisms become activated to 
contain infectious diseases and prevent them from spreading from their countries of origin. The 
burden of disease is consequently carried by developing nations which lack the capacity to address 
these epidemics. This classical conceptualisation of global health security therefore brings little 
benefit to developing nations. Andrew Lakoff (2010) theorises that the classical conceptualisation 
of global health security emphasises only one regime within Global Health Governance, and 
identifies a second regime “humanitarian biomedicine.” This regime aims to target diseases that 
currently afflict the poorer nations of the world in order to alleviate the suffering of individuals, 
regardless of national boundaries or social groupings. Humanitarian biomedicine offers a potential 
solution to the critique regarding what was left out of global health security. The aims of this study 
are to use Lakoff's thesis as a framework to explore how global health security initiatives play out in 
practice, what the aims of global health security initiatives are, what the methods by which attempts 
are made to reach these aims are, and what values underlie these interventions. The research 
question that this research investigates is thus whether the two regimes of global health security, as 
theorised by Lakoff, can be identified in practice in the event of an infectious disease outbreak such 
as the Ebola outbreak of 2014, and if so, what  the implications or utility of a broader approach to 
global health security are. The main research question is supplemented by three sub-questions 
relating to (1) the implications of the development of a more humanitarian orientated global health 
security regime for developing states, (2) whether these two regimes can be complementary in 
practice as suggested by Lakoff and (3) what the existence of these two regimes provide in answer 
to the “security for whom, security from what?” question. It is found that two differing regimes can 
be identified in Global Health Governance initiatives during the Ebola outbreak. While aspects of a 
broader approach to global health security do exist, they are not the dominant considerations. The 
current configuration of Global Health Governance is not effective in addressing global health 
insecurity. A broader conceptualisation of health security that includes humanitarian concerns is 
thus necessary.  
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Opsomming 
Die begrip gesondheidsekuriteit is van toenemende belang sedert die 1990’s as gevolg van ŉ 
hernude bewuswording van die gevare van bestaande en ontluikende aansteeklike siektes. Die 
kruispunt tussen gesondheid, die staat en sekuriteit is egter bestrede. Die kern vraag rondom 
gesondheidsekuriteit hou verband met die betekenis en implikasies van die konsep, veral met 
betrekking tot die doelstellings, metodes en waardes van gesondheidsekuriteit. Die vrae kom basies 
neer op “sekuriteit vir wie en sekuriteit van wat?” Die antwoord wat baie ontleders bereik is dat 
wêreldwye gesondheidsekuriteit gemoeid is met die bekamping van potensieel gevaarlike en snel 
verspreidende aansteeklike siektes, en die gepaardgaande waarneming van siektes. Die punt word 
gemaak dat die versterking van die waarnemingsmetodes van aansteeklike siektes min voordeel 
inhou vir lande wat nie oor genoegsame openbare gesondheidsinfrastruktuur beskik om effektief te 
reageer op die siektes nie. Gesondheidsekuriteit is dus meer aangepas vir die bekamping van 
uitbrake as die voorkoming van hierdie siektes. Wat dit beteken is dat wêreldwye 
gesondheidsekuriteit meganismes slegs geaktiveer word om aansteeklike siektes te bekamp  en te 
voorkom dat hulle verder versprei van hul area van oorsprong. Die las van die siektes word dus deur 
ontwikkelende lande gedra, wat nie oor die vermoë beskik om die epidemies aan te spreek nie. Die 
oorspronklike  konseptualisering van wêreldwye gesondheidsekuriteit hou dus min voordeel in vir 
ontwikkelende lande. Andrew Lakoff (2010) teoretiseer egter dat die oorspronklike 
konseptualisering van wêreldwye gesondheidsekuriteit slegs een regeringstelsel opmaak binne  
wêreldwye gesondheidsbestuur en identifiseer ŉ tweede regeringstelsel, die sogenaamde 
‘humanitarian biomedicine’. Die stelsel poog om die siektes wat tans die armer lande in die wêreld 
kwel aan te spreek om so doende die lyding van individue te verlig ongeag van nasionaliteit of 
sosiale stand. Humanitarian biomedicine bied dus ŉ moontlike oplossing vir die kritiek oor wat 
uitgelaat is in wêreldwye gesondheidsekuriteit. Die doelwit van hierdie studie is om Lakoff se tesis 
te gebruik as ŉ raamwerk om te ondersoek hoe wêreldwye gesondheidsekuriteit in praktyk 
uitgevoer word, asook wat die doelwitte, metodes en waardes van hierdie ingrypings is. Die 
navorsingsvraag van hierdie studie is dus: kan die twee regeringstelsels van wêreldwye 
gesondheidsekuriteit, soos geteoretiseer deur Lakoff, in die praktyk geïdentifiseer word in die geval 
van ŉ uitbraak van ŉ aansteeklike siekte soos die Ebola uitbraak van 2014? Indien dit wel die geval 
is, wat is die implikasies of nuttigheid van ŉ breër benadering tot wêreldwye gesondheidsekuriteit? 
Die hoof vraag word aangevul deur drie verdere vrae wat verband hou met (1) die implikasies van 
die ontwikkeling van ŉ meer humanitêr georiënteerde wêreldwye gesondheidsekuriteit vir 
ontwikkelende state, (2) of die twee regeringstelsels in praktyk aanvullend kan wees soos voorgestel 
deur Lakoff, en (3) wat die bestaan van hierdie twee regeringstelsels bied in antwoord tot die vraag 
van “sekuriteit vir wie, sekuriteit van wat?” Daar word bevind dat die twee regeringstelsels wel 
geïdentifiseer kan word in wêreldwye gesondheidsbestuur inisiatiewe gedurende die Ebola uitbraak. 
Terwyl aspekte van ŉ breër benadering tot wêreldwye gesondheidsekuriteit dus wel bestaan, is dit 
nie die oorheersende oorweging nie. Die gevolgtrekking kan dus gemaak word dat die bestaande 
samestelling van wêreldwye gesondheidsbestuur nie geskik is vir die aanspreek van wêreldwye 
gesondheids-onveiligheid nie. ŉ Breër konseptualisering van gesondheidsekuriteit wat humanitêre 
bekommernisse insluit is dus nodig.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Disorders can be quickly healed if they are seen well in advance (and only a prudent ruler has  
such foresight); yet when, for lack of a diagnosis, they are allowed to grow in such a way that 
everyone can recognise them, remedies are often far too late -  Machiavelli (1961:12).  
1.1. Introduction and rationale 
1.1.1. Disease: enemy of humanity and state 
We as humans often see ourselves as at the top of the natural hierarchy and yet we are not 
invulnerable. We are attacked daily by an unseen enemy: bacteria, viruses and other microbes 
that cause disease. For millennia humans have suffered and died from disease, an occurrence 
that has had, and will continue to have an impact on the working and safe being of society. 
Our tendency to settle together in towns and cities for sanctuary and security, leading to the 
trend of increased urbanisation, has also brought with it an increased risk of disease. One of 
the most salient examples of the effects of disease on society is the outbreak of the bubonic 
plague in the Middle Ages aptly termed the Black Death. It is estimated that the disease 
caused the death of a third of Europe’s entire population. This outbreak is not only credited 
with giving rise to quarantine practices (Kamradt-Scott, 2014:190), but also had a number of 
wider social implications for European society at the time. As stated by Porter (1999:30-31) 
the outbreak contributed to great political, economic, and social changes. The massive loss of 
lives created a new demand for labour that raised the value of the human body and 
encouraged greater geographic and social mobility, undermining the tenets of feudalism.  
With the establishment of the modern state system, countries became even more aware of the 
“importance of the human body in providing economic and physical security to guarantee 
state sovereignty” (Kamradt-Scott, 2014:190). Public health thus became an important focus 
for the state because, as argued above, the health of its citizenry correlated with its military 
strength and thus directly with the security of the state. Medical scientists however still had 
no idea of how diseases were transmitted, and the focus was thus on sanitary practices for the 
prevention of disease, and quarantine was the only control measure when an outbreak did 
occur. With colonisation, and the resulting contact between Westerners and societies in the 
rest of the world, both groups were exposed to more novel diseases originating elsewhere to 
which they had no immunity. One of the most devastating examples of this is the spread of 
smallpox in the Americas, introduced by the conquering Spaniards under the leadership of 
Cortez. By 1595, over 18 million Native American people had died of smallpox and other 
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European diseases such as mumps and measles (Cartwright, 1972:120). On the other hand 
Europeans were ravaged by diseases such as cholera with which they were unfamiliar.  
In 1851 the first International Sanitary Convention was held in France. This was an attempt to 
formalise international quarantine arrangements for cholera, predominantly between 
European countries. Between 1851 and 1944 fourteen further international sanitary meetings 
were held in response to the impacts of disease outbreaks on public health and international 
trade (Fidler, 2001:845). This period also saw the development of international health 
organisations to facilitate cooperation on infectious diseases, among which the Office 
International de l’Hygiène Publique (1907), the Health Organisation of the League of Nations 
(1923) and the World Health Organisation (1948). While the outbreak of the World Wars 
disrupted international cooperation on health issues temporarily, multilateral efforts were 
resumed in the aftermath with renewed force under the banner of the World Health 
Organisation (Kamradt-Scott, 2014:191).  
By 1948 the threat to the international community posed by infectious diseases was well 
recognized. In 1918 the world experienced one of the most devastating epidemiological 
events in recorded human history, the Spanish Influenza pandemic, which killed 
approximately 40 million people worldwide (Kamradt-Scott, 2014:192). In addition to this 
several major epidemics of typhus, typhoid, malaria, cholera and yellow fever had a 
demonstrable impact on military forces throughout WWII, as well as hampering post-war 
reconstruction efforts. The security implications, not only in terms of loss of life, but also the 
potential economic damage due to the disruption to international trade, were clear. In 1951 
the International Sanitary Regulations (later renamed the International Health Regulations) 
were created to “ensure maximum security against the international spread of diseases with a 
minimum interference with world traffic” (WHO, 1983:5).The International Health 
Regulations stated that member states were expected to report the outbreaks of six specific 
infectious diseases: cholera, typhoid, yellow fever, plague, smallpox and typhus. These 
diseases were targeted due to their highly contagious nature, the widespread human suffering 
they caused, as well as the fact that they had proven to be particularly disruptive to 
international trade (Kamradt-Scott, 2014:192). 
With the advent of the Cold War, the rising concern about more conventional security 
considerations started to reduce the significance of health as a security issue. Attention and 
resources were increasingly diverted to the strengthening of national defensive capabilities. 
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At the same time advancements in science and medicine created a sense of optimism that 
infectious diseases no longer presented the threat they once had, as summed up by Porter 
(1999:1), “public health appeared to be victorious in achieving massive reductions in 
mortality rates in the Western world, when scientific medicine seemed to have almost 
eliminated the menace of pestilence.” This sense was strengthened with the eradication of 
smallpox in the 1970s (Kamradt-Scott, 2014:193). In the 1980s this false sense of 
invulnerability was however shattered by the emergence of various new infectious diseases, 
the most prominent of which is HIV/AIDS. The development of antibiotics and vaccines 
coupled with improvement in water, sanitation, healthcare and food quality standards had led 
to unprecedented levels of health in high-income states. However HIV/AIDS affected the 
populations of Western countries as easily and as adversely as it was affecting low-income 
countries (Kamradt-Scott, 2014:193). 
At the same time the end of Cold War hostilities and the decline in prominence of traditional 
security concerns led to a process of redefinition of the post-Cold War security agenda. Since 
the 1990s a broadening and deepening of what falls under the umbrella of security has been 
taking place. The focus is thus no longer just narrowly confined to traditional military 
concerns, but also includes amongst others, health concerns. The reasoning behind this 
redefinition is that “new global health risks had appeared as a result of emerging and re-
emerging diseases, increased population mobility, spreading transnational crime, 
environmental change, and bioterrorism, and these posed new security dangers” (McInnes, 
2014:7). 
A further expansion also took place from the singular focus of state security to the 
consideration of human security, shifting the focus of security from the state to people. As 
argued by the UNDP (1994:22): 
[Security] has for too long been interpreted narrowly: as security of territory from external 
aggression, or as protection of national interests in foreign policy... Forgotten were the 
legitimate concerns of ordinary people who sought security in their daily lives... For many of 
them, security symbolizes protection from the threat of disease, hunger, unemployment, crime, 
social conflict, political repression and environmental hazards... For most people, a feeling of 
insecurity arises more from worries about daily life than from the dread of a cataclysmic world 
event. 
Several changes in the conceptualisation of security thus led to the rise of the importance of 
health on the global political agenda. The most notable example of this was the decision by 
the United Nations Security Council in 2000 to pass resolution 1308 that identified 
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HIV/AIDS as a threat to international peace and security (Feldbaum, Patel, Sondorp & Lee, 
2006:192). In the last decade and a half, a number of outbreaks of novel infectious diseases, 
such as Severe Acute Respitory Syndrome (SARS) in 2003 and several influenza outbreaks, 
notable among which  was the H1N1 (swine flu) outbreak in 2009, occurred. These events 
led to the further development of the health securitisation agenda. While the use of the 
concept of security to advance public health objectives is lauded for generating greater 
political commitment and securing additional resources, it has also attracted criticism.  
The central question raised by critiques of the health security agenda is focused on the 
meaning and implications of the concept. Questions are raised about the aims, methods and 
values of health security. As argued by Rushton (2011:779) the question boils down to 
security for whom and security from what? The answer many scholars give is that global 
health security as defined by the IHR (International Health Regulations), is essentially 
concerned with the “containment of potentially serious and rapidly spreading infectious 
disease threats, whether natural or man-made” (Rushton, 2011:788), with the focus on 
disease surveillance. Aldis (2008:373) makes the succinct point that the “strengthening of 
surveillance for epidemic-prone diseases brings little benefit to any country which lacks the 
public health infrastructure necessary for an effective response.” While health security 
initiatives have brought benefits to developing nations (specifically in the form of major 
funding such as PEPFAR) health security endeavours are geared more towards outbreak 
containment rather than disease prevention. What this essentially means is that global health 
security mechanisms become activated to contain infectious diseases and prevent them from 
spreading from their origin (mainly in the developing world due to several factors, chief 
among which a lack of health infrastructure) to the rest of the world. The burden of disease is 
thus mainly carried by developing nations who largely lack the capacity to address these 
epidemics. This classical conceptualisation of global health security thus brings little benefit 
to developing nations  
1.2. Problem statement and research question 
Andrew Lakoff (2010) however theorises that this classical conceptualisation of global health 
security typifies only one regime within global health security and he identifies a second 
regime which he terms “humanitarian biomedicine”. This regime aims to target diseases that 
currently afflict the poorer nations of the world in order to alleviate the suffering of 
individuals, regardless of national boundaries or social groupings (2010:60). Humanitarian 
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biomedicine thus offers a potential solution to the critique of what was left out of global 
health security. Lakoff posits that the two regimes “might best be understood as 
complementary rather than inherently contradictory facets of contemporary Global Health 
Governance” and if so “humanitarian biomedicine could be seen as offering a philanthropic 
palliative to nation-states lacking public health infrastructure in exchange for the right of 
international health organizations to monitor their populations for outbreaks that might 
threaten wealthy nations” (2010:75), creating a more mutually beneficial and truly ‘global’ 
health security regime. The aim with this study is to use Lakoff's thesis as a framework to 
explore how global health security initiatives play out in practice, what the aims of global 
health security initiatives are, what the methods by which it is attempted to reach these aims 
are, and what values underlie these interventions. Lakoff’s framework is applied to the recent 
outbreak of Ebola Virus Disease in West Africa (2014-2015) as a case study. This case study 
might prove to be a useful way of analysing the thesis propagated by Lakoff as it showcases 
the interaction between the Global Health Governance mechanism and the developing world, 
as well as highlighting the interaction between state based and non-state actors in health 
security interventions.   
The research question that this study investigates is: 
• Can two regimes of global health security, as theorised by Lakoff, be identified in 
practice in the event of an infectious disease outbreak such as the Ebola outbreak of 
2014, and if so what are the implications or utility of a broader approach to global 
health security?  
Sub-questions supporting this primary research question include the following: 
• What are the implications of the development of a more humanitarian orientated 
global health security regime for developing states? 
• Can these two regimes be complementary in practice as suggested by Lakoff? 
• What does the existence of these two regimes provide in answer to the “security for 
whom, security from what?” question? 
1.3. Theoretical points of departure 
The theoretical framework that is used in this study to explore the aims, methods and values 
of global health security, is the thesis developed by Andrew Lakoff. Lakoff identifies two 
regimes of global health: global health security and humanitarian biomedicine. According to 
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Lakoff the juxtaposition of these two regimes usefully highlights some of the tensions 
inherent in many contemporary global health initiatives (2010:59). Lakoff starts from the 
premise that global health is not a unified field. He argues that “different projects of global 
health imply starkly different understandings of the most salient threats facing global 
populations, of the relevant groups whose health should be protected, and of the appropriate 
justification for health interventions that transgress national sovereignty” (2010:59). 
According to Lakoff each of these regimes combines normative and technical elements to 
provide a rationale for managing infectious disease on a global scale. The two regimes thus 
rest on very different visions of both the social order that is at stake in global health and the 
most appropriate technical means of achieving it (2010:59). Each regime is however ‘global’ 
in the sense that it strives to transcend certain limitations posed by the national governance of 
public health (2010:60). The two regimes also differ with regard to the type of ethical 
relationship implied by a project of global health. As explained by Lakoff “the connection 
between health advocates and the afflicted (or potentially afflicted) can be one of either moral 
obligation to the other, or protection against risk to the self” (2010:60). A brief overview of 
the delineation between global health security and humanitarian biomedicine can be viewed 
in the following table. 
Table 1-1: Regimes of Global Health 
 Global Health Security Humanitarian Biomedicine 
Type of threat Emerging infectious diseases 
that threaten wealthy countries 
Neglected diseases that 
afflict poor countries 
Source of pathogenicity Social and ecological 
transformations linked to 
globalization 
Failure of development; lack 
of access to health care 
Organizations and actors National and international 
health agencies; technocrats 
NGOs, philanthropies, 
activists 
Techno-political 
interventions 
Global disease surveillance; 
building response capacity; 
rapidly develop biomedical 
interventions to manage novel 
pathogens 
Provide access to essential 
medicines; drug and vaccine 
research and development for 
disease of the poor 
Target of Intervention National public health 
infrastructure 
Suffering individuals 
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Ethical stance Self-protection Common humanity 
(Lakoff, 2010:64). 
These two regimes contain two narratives on Global Health Governance found in the 
literature on health security in International Relations. The first, global health security 
follows the dominant narrative based on national security approaches. The second, 
humanitarian biomedicine, is focused more on human security and developmental 
approaches.   
1.4. Research design and methods 
The method applied in this study is a qualitative desktop study based on interpretations of 
secondary sources obtained from the University of Stellenbosch’s library and databases. The 
qualitative method was chosen due to the nature of the topic being studied. A qualitative 
approach is more adept in obtaining in-depth understanding of the discourse around complex 
and multifaceted social and political topics, such as health security. This study furthermore 
makes use of a single case study, the 2014 Ebola outbreak in West Africa, to investigate the 
hypothesis developed by Lakoff. As mentioned by Neuman (2005:14) one of the 
characteristics of qualitative research designs is the fact that the context is critical. By 
focussing on only one case study the findings of this study may not translate to other 
contexts. While multiple cases provide a “more robust test of theory and can specify the 
conditions under which hypotheses and theories may or may not hold” (Burnham, Lutz, 
Grant & Layton-Henry, 2008:65); due to time and space limits this research makes use of 
only this single recent case. The limitation of this study is thus that it may not be suited to 
generalisation, as the Ebola case study is unique and not a representative sample, but the 
method is still useful as data on a wide range of variables can be collected and a relatively 
complete account of the event can be given (Burnham et al., 2008:66). This study thus 
provides a relevant and contemporary analysis of whether Lakoff’s thesis, that two regimes 
can be identified within global health security, hold true and how this plays out in practice. 
The research thus makes use of the deductive method. As explained by Babbie (2011:52) 
“deduction begins with an expected pattern that is tested against observation, whereas 
induction begins with observation and seeks to find a pattern within them.” 
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1.5. Chapter layout  
Chapter 1: Introduction. This chapter aims to introduce the reader the background and main 
discussion around the topic of health security. The research problem and question is also 
presented, and the theoretical model demonstrated. Lastly the research method used in the 
study is also elaborated on.  
Chapter 2: Germ meets state: health securitisation. In this chapter the history of the 
development of Global Heath Governance, especially in terms of global governance of 
infectious diseases and the accompanying process of health securitisation will be explored. 
The first section focusses on the conceptual development of health security, while the second 
section explores the institutions of Global Health Governance.  
Chapter 3: The Lakoff Thesis. In this chapter a theoretical background to the study will be 
provided locating Lakoff’s framework in the broader literature on health security in 
International Relations. This chapter furthermore elaborates on Lakoff’s thesis of Two 
Regimes of Global Health.  
Chapter 4: The Ebola Outbreak of 2014-15. In this chapter the validity of Lakoff’s thesis 
will be analysed by means of a case study focusing on the recent outbreak of the Ebola Virus 
in West Africa.  
Chapter 5: Conclusion. The concluding chapter provides a summary of the study, as well as 
discussing the points that can be drawn from the analysis of Lakoff’s framework. The 
research questions are also explicitly answered. This chapter furthermore suggest avenues for 
future research.  
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Chapter 2: Germ meets state: health securitisation 
2.1. Introduction 
In Chapter 1 the research problem of this study was linked to one of the central questions 
identified within the health security agenda regarding the meaning and implications of the 
concept of Global Health Governance. Questions are often raised about the aims, methods 
and values of health security. As argued by Rushton (2011:779) the question boils down to 
“security for whom and security from what?” The answer that is generally reached is that 
global health security is centred on the principles of international and national security, thus 
geared towards protecting the state from the spread of serious infectious disease epidemics 
and the resulting negative impacts. The mechanisms of global health security are 
consequently focused on disease surveillance and containment, which largely only proves 
beneficial to states that possess the health infrastructure and capacity to address these 
diseases. Building on this mainstream approach to global health security, Lakoff (2010) 
proposes the existence of two regimes within global health. The first of these is the classical 
global health security regime centred on state security. The second regime, humanitarian 
biomedicine, has a broader scope and attempts to address the burden of disease carried 
mainly by developing states. This study aims to answer the question of whether the two 
regimes of global health security, as theorised by Lakoff, can be identified in practice, and if 
so what the implications or utility of a broader approach to global health security will be?  
 In Chapter 2 an overview of the history of the development of Global Health Governance, 
especially in terms of the global governance of infectious diseases and the accompanying 
process of health securitisation is provided. In this chapter the political, institutional and legal 
pillars of global health security are also explored in more depth in order to provide an 
overview of the main discussions within the literature on the subject. In the first section of 
this chapter the focus is on the development of the ideas that formed the basis for the 
development of Global Health Governance, especially the emerging disease world view, and 
the way in which health and security have become linked. In the second section the 
development of the institutions of global health security are delineated.   
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2.2. The conceptional foundations of Global Health Governance  
2.2.1. The return of the microbe and the emerging disease world view 
In 1969 US Surgeon General William H. Stewart made the now infamous announcement that 
“it is time to close the book on infectious diseases, declare the war on pestilence won, and 
shift national resources to such chronic problems as heart disease” (Mayer, 2000:938). By the 
end of the 1980s this claim became increasingly unlikely due to the appearance of new 
diseases as well as the increasing incidences of diseases previously thought to be under 
control. Emerging infectious diseases1 increasingly began drawing the attention of public 
health experts during the 1990s. This focus was in response to the AIDS crisis and the 
appearance of drug-resistant strains of diseases such as tuberculosis and malaria (Lakoff & 
Collier, 2008:9). The concept of emerging and re-emerging disease was developed in the 
works of Stephen Morse (Emerging Diseases, 1993) and the Nobel prize-winning J. 
Lederberg (Emerging Infections: Microbial Threats to the United States, 1992). Alarm about 
these emerging and re-emerging diseases came from various sources such as scientific reports 
by eminent organisations such as the National Academy of Science’s Institute of Medicine 
(Emerging Infections: Microbial Threats to Health in the United States), the reports of 
journalists such as Laurie Garrett (The Coming Plague: Newly Emerging Disease in a World 
Out of Balance, 1994; The Return of Infectious Disease, 1996), as well local and national 
health officials and national security experts. Observers feared that the emerging disease 
threat, combined with weakening public health systems, amounted to a troubling reversal in 
the history of public health (Lakoff & Collier, 2008:9). The perception that infectious 
diseases were being conquered was waning and experts warned that we were witnessing a 
“return of the microbe.” This led Barret, Kuzawa, McDade and Armelagos (1998:264) to 
conclude that “unfortunately the book on infectious diseases remains very much open and 
new chapters continue to be added at an alarming pace.” The emerging disease worldview 
was thus adamant that all segments of society have to be prepared for new risks (Figuie, 
2014:474). 
2.2.2. Linking health and security 
Traditionally the link between security and health is narrowly focussed on the manner in 
which disease may affect military capacity and hence the security of the state. The focus thus 
falls on the impact of disease on military operations, and vice versa, the impact of conflict on 
                                                 
1Referring to “viruses that either have newly appeared in the population or are rapidly expanding their range, 
with a corresponding increase in cases of disease” (Morse, 1993:10). 
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health and health care capacity (McInnes, 2014:7). In other words how health and disease can 
impact on the “high politics”2 of state security and survival (Davies, 2010a:1). Conflict 
brings about immediate links between health and security in the form of soldiers and civilians 
wounded and displaced by war, but also has further medium and long term impacts. In the 
“medium-term the  impact is felt when people are uprooted and forced to live in camps with 
little sanitation or health services, schools are disrupted, and food is scarce”(Brundtland, 
2003:418). The impact of conflicts are compounded in the long term “when people spill 
across borders or flee their homes, professionals emigrate, and health and education systems 
crumble” (Brundtland, 2003:418). This process consequently creates a vicious circle of 
worsening social, economic and health conditions that provide a breeding ground for diseases 
and epidemics, thus linking it to the “low politics” of public health. This indicates the overall 
importance of health to the longevity of the state both in terms of security and capacity.  
This traditional view of the link between health and security has been broadening due to 
various factors. The WHO indicates that recent trends in population growth, the incursion 
into previously uninhabited areas, rapid urbanisation, intensive farming practices, 
environmental degradation, and the misuse of antimicrobials have led to a disruption in the 
equilibrium of the microbial world (2007:vi). This has led to the emergence and re-
emergence of infectious diseases. Since at least the 1980s we have experienced what some 
call a return of the microbe. Not only has there been an increase in the occurrence of 
infectious diseases (known, and unknown), but this has been accompanied by a decrease in 
the effectiveness of our methods of fighting these diseases due to the development of drug 
resistant strains. Furthermore these diseases have the potential to spread rapidly and globally 
due to increased population mobility owing to globalisation. In the words of Brundtland 
(2003:418): 
Globalization has shrunk distances, broken down old barriers, and linked people. Problems 
halfway around the world become everyone’s problem. Like a stone thrown on the waters, a 
difficult social or economic situation in one community can ripple and reverberate around the 
world.  
Price-Smith adds that developed states moreover came to the realisation that they were far too 
complacent and have failed to realise the fact that “despite their enormous technological and 
                                                 
2 High politics as the traditional concern of International Relations namely, peace and security; contrasted to the 
low politics of efforts to increase standards of living and improve quality of life (as defined by McInnes and Lee 
(2012:23). 
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economic power, it is extremely unlikely that developed countries will be able to remain an 
island of health in a global sea of disease” (2002:122).  
Furthermore since the end of the Cold War, there has been a departure from the sole focus on 
military might when defining threat. This has opened intellectual and policy space for the 
consideration of threats of a non-military nature (Yuk-ping & Thomas, 2010:447). In 1994 
the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) released an annual report titled New 
Dimensions of Human Security. This document is pointed to by Yuk-Ping and Thomas as a 
“landmark document that established the initial parameters of the then nascent field of non-
traditional security research” (2010:448). The report identified seven fields of human 
security, among which health security (UNDP, 1994:24). In 2000 the status of health as 
security threat was confirmed by the release of a report by the Central Intelligence Agency 
(CIA) with the title The Global Infectious Disease Threat and Its Implications for the United 
States (CIA, 2000). In the same year the UN Security Council declared HIV/AIDS to be “a 
threat to international peace and security” with the acceptance of Resolution 1308 which 
formalised the securitisation of the disease (Youde & Rushton, 2014:1; Fourie, 2014:111). In 
2007 the link between health and security was further built on by the WHO in their annual 
report on the global nature of public health security titled A Safer Future: Global Public 
Health Security in the 21st Century. Health challenges have thus increasingly been labelled as 
security threats that create collective insecurity for sovereign states and elevated to the realm 
of “high politics.” Effective health governance is consequently framed as a “matter of 
national and international security that demands sophisticated surveillance, 
institutionalisation, and health policy prescriptions crafted at the multilateral level and then 
applied to the whole world” (Fourie, 2014:105).  
2.2.3. Classifying health security 
Health security can be approached from various angles. A useful classification is made by 
McInnes (2014:7) who identifies four terms which are used in debates over health security in 
the global context: national and international security, human security, bio-security and 
global (public) health security. These different approaches have different implications both 
for the range of health issues involved and for whose security is at risk. McInnes thus argues 
that each of these terms are “constructed for a particular purpose including promoting a 
certain agenda and privileging certain interests over others” (2014:7). In the next section each 
of these terms is discussed.  
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2.2.3.1. National and international security 
National security is often characterised narrowly with the state as the referent object of 
security. The main concerns are direct threats, usually of a military nature, to the state, so 
called “high politics”. The context within which national security operates is that of an 
“anarchic international state system where self-help is the order of the day” (McInnes, 
2014:8). The concept of international security runs along the same lines with the addition that 
the security of one state is explicitly connected with the security of other states. This 
framework can thus be seen in the same light as the traditional link between security and 
health with the focus on preserving the power of the state. From this point of view the 
emphasis is placed on direct threats which relate to more traditional aspects of security. Ban 
(2003:21) lists “biological weapon attacks, attacks on medical personnel, facilities, and 
supplies by combatants in a conflict, and the declining health status of military personnel, 
peacekeepers, or deployed contingencies due to infectious disease” as examples of direct 
health threats. Indirect security threats involve risks that fit into a broader definition of 
security, such as global health emergencies caused by communicable diseases which have the 
potential to impact national and international security. The national security approach is the 
dominant term used in the literature of health security. Rushton thus summarises that “in 
general then, it seems fairly clear what types of health issues the literature see as threats to 
health security: the threats emanate either from the cross-border spread of infectious diseases, 
whether naturally occurring, deliberate or accidental; or from the effect of major health crises 
on state stability and security” (2011:782).  
Several scholars have however pointed out that the focus is generally no longer solely on 
sovereign power, but also on improving the welfare of the citizens residing within a state 
(Elbe, 2009:86-107; Ingram, 2010). As argued by Altman (2003:417) if the primary aim of 
the state is the protection of the lives of its citizens, then risks to security can come in many 
forms other than just those of conventional warfare. Health issues can thus figure on the 
national security agenda if they are seen as a potential threat to the internal security of the 
state or have an impact on international stability, or cause exceptional levels of morbidity 
and/or mortality3 in populations (McInnes, 2014:15). Examples of this national and 
international security approach to health security is evident in both the CIA report on the 
                                                 
3 Morbidity refers to the relative incidence of disease and mortality to the number of deaths, or proportion of 
death to the population. 
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global infectious disease threat, as well as in the UN declaration of HIV/AIDS as threat to 
international peace and security. 
2.2.3.2. Human security  
The human security approach was developed as a critique of the narrow focus of “high 
politics” on national security and the protection of the state and the importance of the 
inclusion of issues considered as “low politics” which pertain to the protection of the 
individual was advocated. Human security approaches thus attempt to make individuals 
rather than states the referent object of security. The concept of human security was 
developed in various United Nations documents, the most referenced of which are the 1994 
UNDP Human Development report titled New Dimensions of Human Security, and the 2003 
Commission on Human Security's report titled Human Security Now: Protecting and 
Empowering People (Caballero-Anthony & Amul, 2014:33). The roots of these thoughts lie 
in classical liberalism’s emphasis on the individual. Human security is defined as “freedom 
from want and freedom from fear” (Ogata & Sen, 2003:4), with a focus on human rights, 
humanitarianism and poverty relief. Health security was from the outset explicitly identified 
as one of the components of human security (Rushton, 2011:786). It differs from the narrow 
focus on infectious disease threats outlined in national security approaches by viewing health 
security in the broadest sense, including the full range of communicable and non-
communicable diseases as well as explicitly linking health with poverty and inequality. 
Health security from this angle is thus focused on health and development. In principle this 
approach thus “seems to be a good candidate for a version of health security that is better 
equipped to capture the importance of addressing illness for the lives of ordinary individuals” 
(Elbe, 2005: 415-416). 
While the concept of human security provided the traction for the focus on the importance of 
non-traditional security concerns, such as health security, McInnes argues that it has failed 
over the last decade to establish itself as the main security narrative (2014:13). Davies points 
out that “in practice, little progress has been made without calling upon traditional statist 
concerns and without representing health problems as potential threats to state stability, the 
economy and the ‘rich’ world as much as the ‘poor’” (2010b:1189). Rushton agrees with 
Davies‘s analysis and adds that it is in line with what International Relations predicts about 
the role of power in determining global political priorities (2011:792). Rushton furthermore 
ascribes the decline of the human security agenda to the development of other paradigms of 
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global health, namely national and international security and international development 
(2011:792). The shifts occurring in these fields have had the effect that human security’s 
claims to distinctiveness no longer seem as distinctive as they did in 1994. As argued by 
Chandler (2008:427-428), what once seemed a radical approach to security has been 
comfortably integrated into the mainstream of security policy. In terms of health many of the 
health threats to human security are captured in contemporary national and international 
security thinking. In addition to this the distinctive claim of human security, its focus on 
individual and communities, is undermined by the fact that it is both difficult to implement in 
practice in global governance systems dominated by states, as well as the fact that it shares 
much of its ideas with international development and human rights approaches (Rushton, 
2011:793).   
2.2.3.3. Bio-security 
The meaning of the term biosecurity is considered vague, “covering almost everything from 
threats arising from biological weapons to more general risks to public health” (McInnes, 
2014:13). The most specific focus is however generally on the risk posed by the development 
of new micro-organisms in laboratories, which includes both the deliberate and accidental 
release of pathogens outside of controlled laboratory environments. With the rise of concern 
over terrorism since the 9/11 terror attacks on the USA, more focus has also been placed on 
bioterrorism. The 2001 anthrax attack on the USA showed that the threat of terrorists using 
biological agents was far from hypothetical (Kamradt-Scott, 2014:195). One of the main fears 
is thus the occurrence of biological warfare, which is the “use of micro-organisms, toxins 
derived from living organisms, or bio-regulators4 to deliberately cause death or illness” 
(Koblentz, 2014:118). In order to strengthen countries’ capacity to respond to such threats 
forums like the Global Health Security Initiative (GHSI) and the G8 Global Partnership 
Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction were created. New 
momentum was also generated to strengthen protocols of pre-existing arrangements such as 
the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention. Biosecurity thus has a dual concern focussing on 
the release of pathogens whether accidental or intentional. The focus on bioterrorism and 
biological weapons is more closely aligned with traditional notions of issues that threaten 
state security. Fidler (2007:50) points to an alignment between bio-security and traditional 
                                                 
4 “Bio-regulators are chemicals normally produced in the human body that control communication between cells 
and play a crucial role in governing the nervous, endocrine, and immune systems. Small imbalances in the level 
of bio-regulators can have dramatic effects on cognition, emotion, and physiological processes” (Koblentz, 
2014:120). 
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notions of security that is based on the ‘violence paradigm’, “the threat of exogenous 
violence against the state, its military power, or its people.”   
2.2.3.4. Global public health security 
The term global public health security (abbreviated to global health security) is largely 
associated with the WHO and its interest in how risks to public health have been globalised 
(McInnes, 2014:10). The concept has appeared in World Health Assembly Resolutions as 
well as in several reports by the Secretariat (WHO, 2001; WHO 2007). In their 2007 annual 
report the WHO defines global health security as follows: 
Public health security is defined as the activities required, both proactive and reactive, to 
minimise vulnerability to acute public health events that endanger the collective health of 
national populations. Global public health security widens this definition to include acute 
public health events that endanger the collective health of populations living across 
geographical regions and international boundaries… (2007:1).  
The concept of global health security is also frequently used in relation to the revised IHR 
that were adopted by the World Health Assembly in 2005 and came into force in 2007. 
Global health security has thus become inextricably linked to the IHR (Rushton, 2011:787). 
Global health security in the context of the IHR is concerned with the containment of 
potentially serious and rapidly spreading infectious disease threats of the natural or manmade 
variety. This term is thus drawn from national security approaches.  
Some scholars, for example Fidler (2005), argue that the new IHR-based global health 
security regime differs significantly from the ‘classical regime’ of national security that 
preceded it. While it does not completely abandon the state as referent object, some changes 
have been made that favour global health security over national sovereignty. Fidler refers to 
the fact that the WHO is no longer only reliant on information on outbreaks from state 
sources but can now also seek information from a range of non-government sources 
(2005:348). Rushton however argues that what is conceptualised under the IHR (2005) is a 
system of ‘states+’, “a safety net that helps to deal with situations in which a state is either 
unable or unwilling to report a public health emergency of international concern” (2011:789). 
This is thus still a statist rather than a globalist (see next section) version of global health as it 
is still concerned primarily with pathogens crossing state boundaries, and thus corresponds 
with the traditional aim of defending the nation state from exogenous disease threats.    
McInnes furthermore perceives global health security as a call for action, for “collective 
international public health action [to] build a safer future for humanity” (WHO, 2007:ix). The 
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term thus becomes less of an analytical tool to describe a condition and more of a strategy or 
pragmatic practice “to increase awareness and encourage action for change by adding a sense 
of urgency and importance” (McInnes, 2014:11). McInnes thus concludes that “global health 
security is not an objective condition, but something constructed to promote health, a 
traditional task of health services nationally but now taken by [the] WHO onto a global stage 
with added urgency” (2014:11).  
The point made by McInnes on the construction of the global health security agenda 
conforms to the framework developed by Buzan, Waever and de Wilde, the so called 
Copenhagen School. Buzan, Waever and de Wilde state that “it is a choice to phrase things in 
security… terms, not an objective feature of the issue…” (1998:211); or, as explained by 
Waever “the [u]se of the security label does not merely reflect whether a problem is a 
security problem, it is also a political choice, that is, a decision for conceptualization in a 
special way” (Elbe, 2006:125). According to the framework of Buzan, Waever, and de Wilde 
“much [of] security analysis entails making speculative predictions about future 
developments, necessitates prioritizing between competing claims with imperfect 
information, and, especially when it comes to wider social issues, requires deciding about 
whether an issue is best addressed under the heading of security rather than another 
competing framework” (1998:23). Buzan, Waever and de Wilde identify three ways in which 
a social issue can be presented in public debate. Firstly, an issue can remain non-politicised if 
it is not made an issue of public debate or decision. Secondly, it can become politicised if it is 
successfully made part of public policy and subject to public decision. Lastly, in extreme 
cases, an issue can become “securitised” meaning that the issue is “presented as an existential 
threat requiring emergency measures and justifying actions outside the normal bounds of 
political procedure” (1998:24). This does not include all instances in which word ‘security’ is 
used, or all calls for the implementation of emergency measures, but “only to those issues 
that are presented according to the particular logic or grammar of the security speech act” 
(Buzan, Waever, and de Wilde, 1998:25). The criteria for a security speech act are that: “(i) 
securitising actors (such as political leaders, intelligence experts, etc.), (ii) declare a referent 
object (such as a state) to be (iii) existentially threatened (e.g., by an imminent invasion), and 
who make a persuasive call for the adoption of (iv) emergency measures to counter this threat 
(e.g., declare war or impose a curfew)” (Elbe, 2006:125-126). 
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2.2.3.5. Statist and globalist perspectives   
Davies (2010b) offers a further way to classify health security approaches. She argues that 
most of the literature on health security can be divided into two groups. These two groups are 
either “statist” or “globalist” in their perspectives (Davies, 2010b:1171; O’Manique& Fourie, 
2010). The dominant statist perspective is based on traditional notions of national and 
international security and predominantly focussed on how states, as the providers of security, 
can contain health threats that can have a direct impact on their territory (be it economic, 
political or military). Security language is typically used in these analyses. The globalist 
perspective on the other hand is grounded on the well-being and rights of individuals, thus 
focusing on individual health concerns and how actors (states, as well as other local and 
global actors) act to impact the individual’s health security (Davies, 2010b:1167).This 
approach thus has much in common with human security theory which maintains that health 
should be conceptualised as a human right. While the state remains a main actor within the 
globalist perspective, it is viewed as only one of a wide array of actors which have an equally 
significant impact on the health of individuals.  
This classification of health security approaches is similar to that proposed by Lakoff (2010) 
as the two regimes of global health, the statist approach of global health security and the 
more globalist approach of what he terms humanitarian biomedicine (discussed in more detail 
in chapter 3).  
2.2.4. Criticism of health security 
2.2.4.1. To securitise or not 
As discussed above, health security cannot only be approached from different angles, but 
scholars also differ on whether advancing health as an issue of “high politics” is in fact a 
prudent choice. Health securitisation is lauded for increased international mobilisation on 
health issues coupled with more funding earmarked for these concerns. As stated by 
Enemark, the “value of securitisation is that it promises to attract greater political attention 
and resources for protecting human health and human lives in the face of specific infectious 
disease threats” (2007:20). Other authors such as Elbe (2006:126) however point out that 
using the language of security on a growing number of social issues may not always be a 
favourable political development. Several scholars offer similar critiques of this trend. 
Stephen Walt argues that expanding the field of security studies to include non-traditional 
security issues “would destroy its intellectual coherence and make it more difficult to devise 
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solutions to any of these important problems” (1991:213). This is echoed by Deudney who 
points out that “[i]f everything that causes a decline in human well-being is labelled a 
‘security’ threat, the term loses any analytical usefulness and becomes a loose synonym of 
‘bad’” (1990:464). Buzan, Waever and de Wilde also warn that “[b]asically, security should 
be seen as negative, as a failure to deal with issues as normal politics. Ideally, politics should 
be able to unfold according to routine procedures without this extraordinary elevation of 
specific ‘threats’ to pre-political immediacy” (1998:29).  
The danger in securitising social issues is that the word ‘security’ is still connected to defence 
and the state. The language of securitisation is thus intrinsically linked to a statist perspective. 
There are several pitfalls to this perspective. On the one hand it may lead to a greater level of 
state mobilisation, but on the other it can also enable the state to encroach on an increasing 
proportion of social life where it might not be desirable (Buzan, Waever, and de Wilde, 
1998:4). So while securitisation can boost international initiatives by raising awareness and 
resources, it is not without potentially negative consequences. As explained by Elbe “the 
language of security simultaneously pushes responses to the disease away from civil society 
toward military and intelligence organisations with the power to override the civil liberties of 
persons living with the disease” (2006:191). This “threat defence” logic invokes the 
mechanisms of national security and moves away from the norms of human security. In terms 
of health security this can undermine international efforts to address pandemics because it 
makes such efforts “a function of narrow national interest rather than of altruism” (Elbe, 
2006:191). Elbe discusses this concern in connection to the case of HIV/AIDS: 
the securitization of the disease removes the issue from the more cosmopolitan and altruistic 
frameworks of health and development, locating it instead within a state-centric framework, 
where states are primarily concerned with maximizing power and security, rather than with 
addressing wider humanitarian concerns. In such a context, national and international action 
taken on [the disease] is likely to be confined to those instances where it touches upon the 
selfish security interests of states. States may take action to defend their core security interests, 
but they are unlikely to undertake measures extending much beyond these narrow concerns 
(2006:129). 
Peterson adds that “this creates the impression that global health issues are not worth 
addressing in their own right, but only to the extent that they touch upon the core security 
interests of states, which may mean that in the long run, states will cease to be concerned 
about global health in areas where it does not concern their core national security interests” 
(2002:46, 80). 
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Several scholars thus offer the critique that the current global health security regime 
continues to be dominated by the statist perspective (Caballero-Anthony & Amul, 2014:36). 
As argued by Weir & Mykhalovskiy (2010:150-151) “[h]ealth may be securitized, but it is a 
narrow, state-centric version of health security, preoccupied with acute, trans-boundary 
public health emergencies rather than with problems of chronic diseases or social 
determinants of health.” 
2.2.4.2. The intertwining of collective and individual health security 
Another point of criticism of global health security is the WHO ‘all-risk’ approach to 
detection and response designed to address the complete range of trans-border events that 
have acute effects on population health (Weir, 2014:22). A notable point is that endemic 
infectious diseases (diseases with a high and constant prevalence in a region) were not 
included in this all-risk framework because they are rarely associated with trans-border 
epidemics. This all-risk standard is governed by what the WHO terms a ‘dual use’ strategy 
that aims to complement international security with other public health functions, but this is 
often not the case. The WHO defines ‘dual use’  to “signify the benefits to both civilian 
public health and international security thought to arise from strengthening local, national and 
global surveillance and response capacities” (Weir, 2014:27). The WHO thus consistently 
takes the position that in order to be effective requires the strengthening of national and local 
public health systems. The goal of strengthening national core public health capacity in 
surveillance and response for the sake of preventing and controlling the international spread 
of disease however exists in tension with national and local public health goals if they shift 
focus away from diseases that are endemic to a region but  pose  no threat of trans-border 
infection (Weir, 2014:27). The focus of health security as propagated by the WHO is thus 
primarily on collective health security. Several critics argue that collective health security can 
only be achieved by strengthening individual health security (Heymann, 2015:1885). To use 
the cliché: a chain is only as strong as its weakest link. 
Heymann argues that collective health security should be the sum of individual health 
security (security that comes from access to safe and effective health services, products, and 
technology), and thus necessitates global action to provide individuals in all countries with 
access to essential health care (2015:1884). Heymann uses the example of the smallpox 
eradication projects as illustration of the intertwined nature of collective and individual health 
security. During the mid-20th century smallpox was regarded as a collective health security 
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risk. Eradication removed the threat to collective health security, but it was accomplished 
because national eradication programmes had provided access to vaccines for all people at 
risk. Heymann points out that a further outcome of smallpox eradication was a movement to 
provide vaccines to children at risk of childhood infectious diseases. The Expanded 
Programme on Immunization (EPI), established by the WHO and UNICEF in the late 1970s 
now provides sustained vaccine supplies to countries at minimum or no cost and  this 
prevents the spread of several infectious diseases in countries where health systems 
successfully deliver these vaccines. Heymann argues that this programme was not developed 
to provide a vaccine as means to protect collective health security, but to save the lives of 
individual children. One of the diseases targeted by this programme, polio, is now scheduled 
for eradication. Heymann thus concludes that “access to the polio vaccine has thus satisfied 
an individual health security need and at the same time led to herd immunity” (Heymann, 
2015:1885). 
The argument can thus be made that individual health security is the building block for 
collective and global health security. The current Global Health Governance mechanisms are 
however currently focussed on knee-jerk crisis response, activating only in the event of an 
infectious disease outbreak that has the potential to spread across borders. Davies (2010a:18) 
argues that this is due to the fact that securitisation requires shared agreement about the 
source of a threat and involves a particular logic involving identification of threat sources and 
referents. This is based on the theory of securitisation developed by the Copenhagen School. 
As explained earlier, according to this theory for issues to be defined as security issues they 
have to meet strictly defined criteria that distinguish them from the normal run of the mill 
political issues. They have to be “staged as existential threats to a referent object by a 
securitising actor who thereby generates endorsement of emergency measures beyond rules 
that would otherwise bind” (Davies, 2010a:19). This makes securitisation well suited for 
addressing acute crises, such as infectious diseases which are most likely to constitute an 
emergency requiring intensive short-term intervention by states, but less suited for chronic 
health crises or for the alleviation of the underlying cause of infectious disease such as 
poverty and poor health care in developing countries.  
A further issue is the tendency of complacency. Fidler (2009:29) notes that to engage health 
at the foreign policy level requires crisis escalation, but as the crisis passes, public health 
prevention and protection will be neglected again which invariably leaves us vulnerable to 
the next health crisis.  While the state security approach is thus effective in galvanising funds 
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and support in crisis situations this generally only benefits developed states with the health 
infrastructure and capacity to address health crises. This approach will not lead to truly 
‘global’ health security as state self-interest and national security approaches are not geared 
towards attaining health security for all people regardless of their nationality. A solution 
might be to complement the statist approach with a more humanitarian approach as suggested 
by Lakoff.  
2.3. Institutionalising global health security 
The 2007 WHO report identifies three important landmarks in public health: quarantine 
practices, improved sanitation, and immunisation (2007:1-5). These three advances were 
implemented throughout the centuries by national authorities to improve the public health of 
their populations. Health was thus addressed mainly on national level. By the 19th century 
many states had however realised that national borders do not protect them from diseases of 
other regions and as global means of transport were continually improving and populations 
were consequently exposed to diseases from around the globe, a more international mode of 
disease control was necessary. From 1851 to 1900, ten International Sanitary Conferences 
were convened by several European states, focussing on the containment of epidemics within 
their territories (WHO, 2007:7). In 1902 the First International Sanitary Convention of the 
American Republics was held in Washington DC, leading to the creation of the Pan 
American Sanitary Bureau (now called the Pan American Health Organisation). In 1907 a 
European counterpart, the Office International d’Hygiène Publique was established. In the 
wake of the First World War the destruction of much of the public health infrastructure 
resulted in various epidemic outbreaks. The concern over these epidemics was the basis for 
the formation of the League of Nations Health Organisations and, in 1920, the Health 
Organisation set up a temporary epidemic commission tasked with assisting afflicted 
countries (WHO, 2007:7).  
With the end of the Second World War and the forming of the UN the need for a global 
health organisation was put on the agenda once again, leading to the creation of the World 
Health Organisation in 1948. The WHO had an explicit mandate to serve as the “directing 
and co-ordinating authority on international health work” (Kamradt-Scott, 2014:192). In 
accordance with the history of international health cooperation, the WHO was expected to 
play a leading role in preventing, controlling and eradicating infectious diseases, but its role 
also expanded to include the establishment of new international standards and guidelines, 
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assisting member states with technical matters relating to human health, and providing 
leadership in reaching its “primary objective of enabling the world’s population to attain the 
highest possible level of health” (Kamradt-Scott, 2014:192). In 1951 the decision-making 
body of the WHO, the World Health Assembly (WHA), endorsed the International Sanitary 
Conventions (renamed the International Health Regulation in 1969) to “ensure maximum 
security against the international spread of diseases with a minimum interference with world 
traffic” (WHO, 1983:5). Once adopted the IHR were automatically binding on all WHO 
member states. The expectation was that governments would report to the WHO outbreaks of 
certain specific infectious diseases (cholera, typhoid, yellow fever, plague, smallpox and 
typhus). The focus on these diseases was due to the fact that “they were highly contagious, 
caused wide spread human suffering and had proven to be particularly disruptive to 
international trade” (Kamradt-Scott, 2014:192). However, compliance with the rules on 
reporting outbreaks was problematic from the start, with governments frequently failing to 
report outbreaks because of fear of possible repercussions that would impact on travel and 
trade (Cash & Narasimhan, 2000:1359).  
Interest in disease surveillance dwindled between the late 1950s and the early 1990s for 
several reasons, but mainly because countries no longer perceived infectious diseases to be a 
serious threat due to “the advances made in vaccines and treatment, the eradication of 
smallpox, a preoccupation with chronic diseases, and a confidence among health leaders that 
infectious diseases were a problem of the past” (Cash & Narasimhan, 2000:1358). Since the 
1990s disease surveillance gained renewed prominence due to the emergence and re-
emergence of infectious diseases. 
The IHR have been undergoing revision since 1995 with the approval of Resolution 48.13, 
Communicable Disease Prevention and Control: New, Emerging and Re-emerging Infectious 
Diseases. This revision of the IHR process was finalised in 2005 and the new framework 
officially entered into force in June 2007.  The main technical goals of global public health 
action around emerging and re-emerging infectious diseases still remained constant: early 
detection of outbreaks and rapid response to contain them (Weir, 2014:20). In 1997 the 
mechanisms for accomplishing these goals were put in place with the development of the 
Global Outbreak Alert and Response Network (GOARN). GOARN was institutionally tasked 
with “maintaining global health security by ensuring mechanisms for outbreak alert and 
response” (WHO, 2000:17). Previous forms of public health surveillance had been based on 
case reports whereby member states notified the WHO of outbreaks. However, notification 
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was limited, as mentioned above. Event-based monitoring was thus mainly sourced from 
unofficial information that flowed across national borders (Weir, 2014:21).  The Emerging 
and Other Communicable Diseases (EMC) division of the WHO therefore developed the 
Outbreak Verification Team tasked with aligning unofficial outbreak alerts with sovereign 
confirmation of an outbreak from member states.  
Figure 2-1 Decisions Instrument of the Revised International Health Regulations 
 
(WHO, 2005:45).  
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Weir points out that the “techno-scientific apparatus known as ‘global outbreak alert and 
response’ (GOARN) was increasingly also called ‘global health security’ after the approval 
[in 2001] of WHA Resolution 54.14, Global Health Security: Epidemic Alert and Response 
… [i]ts title rendered ‘global health security’ equivalent to ‘epidemic alert and response” 
(2014:21). Weir thus makes the point that global health security generally refers to the global 
outbreak detection and rapid response apparatus that had begun to take organisational form 
from 1995 in the WHO.  
Furthermore the IHR (2005) developed a decision instrument that guides state parties in 
determining what disease events may constitute a “public health emergency of international 
concern” (PHEIC) for the purpose of notifying the WHO (Fidler, 2007:52).This decision tree 
approach identifies “acute health risks that cause, or have the potential to cause, high levels 
of morbidity and mortality as either security threats or public health emergencies of 
international concern” (Fidler, 2007:52). Figure 2-1 shows the decision instrument contained 
in the revised IHR.  
The international security mandate of global health security was further extended by WHA 
Resolution 55.16 in 2002, titled Global Public Health Response to Natural Occurrence, 
Accidental Release or Deliberate Use of Biological and Chemical Agents or Radio-nuclear 
Material that Affect Health. This ‘all-risk’ approach to detection and response was designed 
to address the complete range of trans-border events that have acute effects on population 
health (Weir, 2014:22). See appendix A for a visual representation of the development of 
Global Health Governance.   
2.3.1. Global health actors outside the WHO 
While the WHO  creates the central mechanism and institutions for managing global health, 
Global Health Governance involves a range of actors that interact over several levels from the 
local through  to the national, international and global (MacLean & Brown, 2009:9). Several 
multilateral international organisations have been playing a larger role in global health 
matters, among which the WTO, the United Nations General Assembly (with the adoption of 
the Millennium Declaration in 2000) and the World Bank.  
Since its acknowledgement in the World Development Report (1993) that health plays a 
critical role in economic development, the World Bank has increased its expenditure on 
health and is now one of the main funders (MacLean & Brown, 2009:9). Various other, less 
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prominent organisations, among which several UN organisation (UNICEF, UNDP, UNFPA), 
ILO and IMF also feature in Global Health Governance. Another state-led multilateral 
grouping that has also increasingly been involved in global health issues is the G8. The G8 
has spearheaded several high-profile global health initiatives, such as the Global Fund to 
Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria, the G8 Africa Action Plan, the G8 Health Action 
Plan, as well as specific programmes on infectious diseases such as HIV/AIDS and polio 
(Kirton & Mannell, 2007:115-116). Bilateral relations are also an important part of the 
Global Health Governance architecture, with most of the major industrialised countries 
committing resources individually to research and global health projects. The most significant 
donor here is the United States, who through projects such as the President’s Emergency Plan 
for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) commits billions towards international health initiatives 
(MacLean & Brown, 2009:10). 
Lastly, the involvement of influential non-state actors including pharmaceutical companies, 
civil society organisations and movements, and partnerships between state and non-state 
actors form one of the defining characteristics of Global Health Governance (MacLean & 
Brown, 2009:10). Major initiatives of Global Health Governance are thus invariably 
characterised by leadership that includes mixed actor coalitions, or so called public-private 
partnerships (PPPs). Prominent examples of these public-private partnerships include the 
Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria, the Roll Back Malaria Partnership, the 
Stop TB Partnership, the International AIDS Vaccine Initiative and the Global Alliance for 
Vaccine and Immunisation (GAVI) (Harman, 2012:67). Another set of important actors 
within these private-public partnerships are philanthropic individuals, who range from 
celebrities like Bono, to major financial donors such as the Bill and Melinda Gates 
Foundation5.  A recent partnership of notice is the Health 8 or ‘H8’ consisting of the Gates 
Foundations, the World Bank, the WHO, UNICEF, UNFPA, UNAIDS, GAVI, and the 
Global Fund. The rationale of the H8 is “to provide an informal cooperation forum where 
institutions can share ideas, knowledge, and provide a common strategy for combating some 
of the world’s largest health concerns” (Harman, 2012:81). This grouping differs 
significantly from others such as the G8 in the sense that it is composed of institutions, not 
states.  
                                                 
5 The Gates Foundations gave nearly US$900 million in grants for global health in 2012, and a total of more 
than US$13 billion to global health initiatives since 1994 (Youde, 2014a:12).  
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2.3.2. Challenges to the global health system 
As discussed throughout this chapter, one of the major challenges of Global Health 
Governance is that there is no unified normative framework. There is thus little consensus on 
the “underlying moral and ethical principles that define global health cooperation” (Dodgson, 
Lee & Drager, 2002:21). As discussed by McInnes (2014) Global Health Governance can be 
approached from various positions, each informed by its own narrative on security. This 
challenge is thus linked to the ideational foundations of Global Health Governance. 
The global health system also faces several challenges linked to its main institutions. The first 
challenge is related to defining leadership and authority in Global Health Governance. As 
mentioned in the previous section, health cooperation has evolved to include a complex array 
of actors, operating at different levels (Dodgson, Lee & Drager, 2002:21). While the WHO 
has historical prominence it is no longer the sole guardian of global health, and various 
authors point to a lack of an overarching authority in Global Health Governance (Youde, 
2012:4) which is undermining the capacity to act decisively to address health issues of global 
concern due to the array of vested interests that characterise global politics. The issue of 
leadership and authority is a difficult, but important issue. As pointed out by Dodgson, Lee 
and Drager (2002:22) leadership and authority is important in setting the normative 
framework for global health cooperation, as well as providing “the basis for generating public 
awareness, mobilising resources, using resources rationally through coordinated action, 
setting priorities, and bestowing or withdrawing legitimacy from groups and causes.” 
Related to this is the challenge of generating sufficient resources for global health 
cooperation and distributing them appropriately according to agreed priorities (Dodgson, Lee 
& Drager, 2002:23). The current WHO financing system is ad hoc in nature, reliant on the 
annual spending decisions of member states, and the goodwill of private citizens and 
companies. The WHO discretion in budgetary spending is thus limited. There is also a 
disjuncture between issues promoted by donors and those prioritised by recipients. This issue 
will be discussed in more depth in chapter 3.   
2.4. Conclusion 
 In this chapter the focus is on the development of Global Health Governance, providing a 
broad overview of the field. The idea of health as a security threat developed in the emerging 
disease world view that gained prominence in the 1990s. International health cooperation 
however has a long history stretching back to the first International Sanitary Conference in 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
28 
 
1851 and the main institutions associated with global health also span back to the early 20th 
century, with the main focus on controlling the spread of infectious disease epidemics. The 
prominence of the idea of global health security however is a recent development, propagated 
by the WHO in several reports coinciding with the development of broad global health 
agendas by state and non-state actors, an unprecedented access to funds for health aid and an 
overall shift in thinking about Global Health Governance on a worldwide perspective. The 
concept is however not without problems. Scholars point to the fact that health security is still 
a contested concept, with varying normative conceptualisations and is thus not clearly 
defined. Questions thus arise about the aims, methods and values of health security. As 
pointed out in Chapter 1, these normative differences in global health security approaches are 
the focus of this study. Several scholars furthermore also question the utility and 
appropriateness of securitising health issues. The usefulness of the institutions of Global 
Health Governance is especially questioned. The critique of the institutions of Global Health 
Governance is focussed on a lack of leadership, insufficient funding and overall institutional 
insufficiency. The concept of global health has been developing over several decades, and 
continues to rapidly change in response to a changing global environment. Chapter 3 focusses 
on Lakoff’s theory of the existence of two regimes of Global Health Governance.   
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Chapter 3: The Lakoff thesis 
3.1. Introduction 
In chapter 2 the conceptual and structural foundations of Global Health Governance were 
outlined, along with the main themes on health security in order to contextualise the research 
problem and research question focused on in this study. The aim with this study is to explore 
the possibility of an alternative answer to one of the central question identified within the 
health security agenda, namely “security for whom and security from what?” The research 
question is formulated in accordance with Lakoff's (2010) proposal regarding the existence of 
two regimes within Global Health.  Can two regimes of Global Health be identified in 
practice in the event of an infectious disease outbreak and if so, what are the implications or 
utility of a broader approach to global health security?  
In Chapter 3 the framework suggested by Lakoff is further expanded on. Lakoff founds his 
argument on the fact that Global Health is not a unified field (2010:59). Different 
understandings exist “of the most salient threats facing the global populations, the relevant 
groups whose health should be protected, and the appropriate justification for health 
interventions that transgress national sovereignty” (2010:59). Lakoff thus proposes the 
existence of two regimes within Global Health: global health security and humanitarian 
biomedicine. Lakoff argues that both of these regimes combine normative and technical 
elements to provide a rationale for managing infectious disease on a global scale, but that 
they rest on very different visions of both the social order that is at stake in Global Health and 
the most appropriate technical means of achieving it (2010:59). Both of the regimes are 
however “global” in the sense that they strive to transcend certain limitations posed by 
national governance of public health. Lakoff thus suggests that the juxtaposition between 
these two regimes can be useful in highlighting some of the tensions inherent in many 
contemporary Global Health initiatives. In Chapter 3 Lakoff’s framework, which will be 
applied to the case study of the recent Ebola outbreaks in Western Africa in chapter 4, is 
further unpacked.  Before moving on to Lakoff’s framework it is necessary to provide some 
background on the developments in public health, from a national issue to one of global 
concern, in order to contextualise the so-called ‘crisis of existing, nation-state-based systems 
of public health’ on which Lakoff builds his framework. In the first section there is thus an 
overview of the development of the idea of global public health. This is done in response to 
the crisis of existing, nation-state-based systems of public health.  In the further sections of 
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this chapter Lakoff’s framework is situated in the literature on health and security in IR 
before the framework is explained in more detail. Lastly, some points of critique on aspects 
that might be relevant to the discussion of Global Health but that are not addressed by 
Lakoff’s framework is discussed.  
3.2. Global public health: how we got here 
This section  focuses on the historical development of global public health in relation to the 
‘crisis of nation-state-based systems of public health’ as referred to by Lakoff (2010:63-64). 
Public health has gone hand in hand with human co-habitation for centuries, addressing in the 
most basic form, the issues of cleanliness, water supply and waste removal; from the Greek 
and Roman ideas of health based on the balance of the four humours (Hays, 2009:11), to the 
plagues and quarantines of the Middle Ages. Public health in the modern sense developed in 
the aftermath of the industrial revolution with the health and sanitary reform movements of 
the nineteenth and twentieth centuries that ushered in the era of state health care. These 
public health systems were designed to manage diseases that occur with regularity in a 
national population.  As defined by Winslow: 
Public health is the science and art of preventing disease, prolonging life and promoting 
physical health and efficacy through organized community efforts for the sanitation of the 
environment, the control of communicable infections, the education of the individual in 
personal hygiene, the organization of medical and nursing services for the early diagnosis and 
preventive treatment of disease, and the development of social machinery which will ensure 
every individual in the community a standard of living adequate for the maintenance of health; 
so organizing these benefits in such a fashion as to enable every citizen to realize his birth right 
and longevity (Winslow in Koplan et al., 2009:1993). 
Public health has thus primarily been a domestic state activity categorised as ‘low politics’ 
(King, 2002:764). For most of the twentieth century health policy was only occasionally 
discussed at the international level, and then only in relation to infectious disease outbreaks, 
or large-scale efforts such as the WHO's mass immunisation programme to eradicate 
smallpox (Davies, 2010b:1172). During outbreaks of infectious diseases the emphasis was 
placed on the responsibility of the host state to notify the WHO, and international efforts 
were focussed on developing mechanisms to prevent the outbreak from spreading through 
quarantine measures that regulate trade and travel.  There is however an inherent connection 
between public health and the protection of the interests of states (King, 2002:764). One of 
the key functions of public health is thus the protection of its citizens against external threats, 
particularly infectious diseases carried across national borders. This necessitated the 
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expansion of states’ interest in the health of populations beyond their borders and the creation 
of institutions devoted to international health (King, 2002:765). 
With the creation of international organisations like the UN and WHO in the aftermath of the 
Second World War, health became defined as a human right and the WHO began providing 
assistance to, and formulating strategies for developing countries in order to advance the right 
to health. The link between health and human rights is explicitly made in Article 1 of the UN 
Charter, and Article 25 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. In this document it is 
claimed that:  
Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for… health and wellbeing of himself 
and his family, including food, clothing, housing, medical care and the right to security in the 
event of … sickness, disability…Motherhood and childhood are entitled to special care and 
assistance (UN, 1948, Article 25, paragraphs 1 and 2). 
A push was made for universal access to primary health care in, amongst others, the “Health 
for All by the Year 2000” initiative and the Alma Ata Declaration (Fidler, 2010:5). While the 
WHO achieved important successes with this approach, such as the eradication of smallpox, 
the prominence of international health concerns waned during the Cold War era, being 
surpassed by geopolitical concerns of powerful states coupled with the perceived victory over 
infectious diseases. During the 1970s the world economy also underwent several economic 
crises. This led to a roll back of state functions, especially in developing states that were 
prescribed structural adjustment plans (SAPs) by the World Bank and International Monetary 
Fund. SAPs help governments restructure their economies in order “to control inflation, repay 
international debt and stimulate economic growth” (Pfeiffer & Chapman, 2010:150). 
Furthermore International Financial Institutions (IFIs) provide loans and debt relief if certain 
conditions are met. These conditions included that “governments must reduce their public 
sector workforce and lower remaining salaries, cut public sector budgets, remove subsidies 
and price controls, devalue local currency, sell state-owned enterprises and services, reduce 
taxes on foreign investment, weaken state environmental and labour regulations, and 
deregulate movement of capital” (Pfeiffer & Chapman, 2010:150). The effects of structural 
adjustment on health have been hotly debated since the 1980s (Breman & Shelton, 2007:219) 
with some arguing that this trend led to the weakening and in some cases collapse of public 
health infrastructure in developing countries.  
Since the 1990s there has been renewed impetus in strengthening global health.  A conceptual 
shift from international health (which requires and builds from the unit of the nation) and 
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global public health (which transcends the nation) took place. Global health in general 
implies the consideration of the health needs of all people above the concerns of particular 
nations. Furthermore the term global is also associated with the growing importance of actors 
beyond state-based national and international organisations (Brown, Cueto & Fee, 2006:62). 
As described by Fidler, global public health governance is: “the use of formal and informal 
institutions, rules, and processes by states, intergovernmental organizations, and non-state 
actors to deal with challenges to health that require cross-border collective action to address 
effectively” (2010:3). 
Global health rose in importance in the 1990s due to a renewed realisation of the impact of 
infectious disease that can cross national borders, as embodied in the emerging disease world 
view. Certain health concerns were thus framed as security threats to states. This stemmed 
from the recognition that existing national public health system, designed to manage known 
diseases that occur with regularity in a national population, are inadequate to prepare for the 
potential threat of emerging and re-emerging infectious diseases (Lakoff, 2010:63). The focus 
was consequently placed on preparedness practices such as building capacity for the 
surveillance and containment of potentially catastrophic infectious disease outbreaks, 
especially in low capacity states.  
The collapse of public health infrastructure also gave rise to developmental efforts to provide 
adequate health infrastructure to lessen the burden of disease on developing countries. As 
stated consistently by the WHO in its annual reports over a decade (1999-2009), a third of 
annual deaths globally, especially in poorer countries, are premature in the sense that they are 
“preventable or curable with existing knowledge, technology, medical and financial 
resources” (Lisk, Sehovic & Sekalala, 2015:27). From this angle the crisis is not disease 
emergence but the political and technical failure that led to the collapse of public health 
infrastructure. These two differing responses to the “crisis of nation-state-based systems of 
public health” form the basis for Lakoff's two regimes of global health. 
3.3. Situating Lakoff in the literature 
 In this section the theoretical grounding of Lakoff's framework is firstly expanded on. This is 
followed by a discussion of each of the categories of Lakoff’s framework in the next section. 
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3.3.1. Incorporating health in IR 
3.3.1.1. Traditional IR theories 
Traditional accounts of International Relations are concerned with the relations (especially in 
terms of power) between states (Waltz, 1979), as well as extending to accommodate other 
major international actors such as international organisations (Keohane and Nye, 1977; 
Keohane, 1984; Nye, 1988). A distinction is thus made between domestic and international 
concerns, with the latter forming the core of IR. A key area of investigation is the system in 
which states operate (McInnes & Lee, 2012:24). Traditional theories agree that the state 
systems are inherently anarchic, they are however in disagreement on whether national 
interest is best achieved through cooperation (neo-liberal) or the competitive maximising of 
state power (realist and neo-realist theories). These state actors are furthermore perceived to 
be rational, basing their behaviour on assessments of what is in their best interest.  In both of 
these theories war and peace have traditionally been the key issue facing the international 
state system. (Neo-) liberalism and (neo-)realism are both positivist theories based on the 
understanding “that knowledge is advanced through systematic, and methodologically 
rigorous, collection of data which then enables the investigator to identify patterns of 
behaviour.” Then “these patterns allow investigators to build theories by inferring the causes 
behind actions and to use these theories to predict how subjects might behave” (McInnes & 
Lee, 2012:25). The role of theory from this perspective is to explain the world; a world that is 
considered to be external to the observer, and the resulting theory is thus separate from the 
world it is trying to explain. These traditional theories did not provide space for the 
consideration of health issues as relevant to the field of IR as health was perceived as a 
mainly domestic issue. McInnes and Lee however point to several examples  where health 
could have featured more prominently in the traditional agenda for IR such as in 
Development Studies and in the study of human rights (2012:27-28). McInnes and Lee 
furthermore argue that “the cross/trans-border nature of many health issues pose important 
and interesting questions about the importance of cooperation and the establishment of rules 
and norms of behaviours” and “the potential for many diseases to spread between countries 
raises issues about the authority of international organisations” (2012:29). Health issues thus 
proves a fruitful avenue of research within IR    
3.3.1.2. Critical theory 
A distinction is moreover made between traditional ‘problem-solving theory’ and ‘critical 
theory’ (Cox, 1981; Horkeimer, 1982). The distinction is based on the purpose for which 
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theory is built. Where traditional theories are considered as external to the world, critical 
theory rejects this distinction and thus “stands apart from the prevailing order and asks how 
that order came about” (Cox, 1981:129).   
For example, contrary to positivist approaches, constructivists argue that “the theories we 
hold cannot be deemed neutral and divorced from the world they seek to explain or 
understand; rather they construct or constitute the world” (McInnes and Lee, 2012:29). The 
values, norms and assumptions of investigating the world are thus important to how we 
understand the world, as the world is of our making and reflects our normative prejudices. 
This approach is more reflectivist, interested in the meaning and beliefs held by actors. This 
does not mean the material world is of no concern. Constructivists maintain that the material 
and ideational worlds closely interact with each other. As explained by Ruggie: 
Constructivists hold the view that the building blocks of international reality are ideational as 
well as material; that ideational factors have normative as well as instrumental dimensions; that 
they express not only individual but collective intentionality; and that the meaning and 
significance of ideational factors are not independent of time and place (Ruggie, 1998:33). 
An important distinction made by constructivists is the potential for change in the manner in 
which we understand the world, perceive our own interests and ultimately how we behave in 
accordance. Interests are thus not objective givens, but created inter-subjectively, or as put by 
Wendt: “actors do not have a ‘portfolio’ of interests that they carry around independent of 
social context; instead, they define their interests in the process of defining situations  and … 
identities, and interests are constituted by collective meanings that are always in process” 
(1992:398,407). As Smith points out the potential is thus that “having created [interest] we 
could create them otherwise; it would be difficult because we have all internalised the ‘way 
the world is’, but we could make it otherwise” (2001:244). Social constructivism would thus 
suggest that health was ignored as interests were not created in a way that allowed 
engagement with these issues (McInnes and Lee, 2012:30). McInnes and Lee thus suggest 
that the bipolar politics of the Cold War, with their narrow focus on issues of security, led to 
the exclusion of health issues in IR. By the end of the Cold War the social and material 
contexts was changing, and with them perceived interest, allowing global health to emerge on 
the IR agenda (2012:30). The most prominent example of the rising importance of health 
issues on the global stage was the Alma-Ata Declaration of 1978, bringing together Western 
and Soviet states to discuss the pressing need of primary health care. Arising from the 
changes at the end of the Cold War, the ideas of human security and the need for broadening 
the security agenda developed a degree of purchase in the academic and policy worlds. At the 
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same time more emphasis was placed on the way in which globalisation was affecting world 
politics. Within this context the incorporation of health into IR seems relatively 
straightforward. Thus, in the last couple of decades, health issues have increasingly featured 
as part of the academic agenda of IR (examples include Elbe, 2009, 2010; Davies 2010).  
Research into health security can thus be approached from various theoretical angles, 
conforming to traditional security frameworks, or the contesting critical theory approaches, 
such as social constructivism. The theoretical angle of the research will influence the 
dominant narrative found within the research. While Lakoff does not explicitly state his 
theoretical orientation, the underlying nature of his argument points to a critical approach, 
especially his claim that global health can be approached from differing normative stands 
which influence the ethical, political and technical interventions that are proposed by actors 
in global health. His concluding remarks also give the sense that change in the way health 
security is defined is possible, which corresponds to one of the founding conceptualisations 
of critical security studies provided by Krause and Williams: 
Our appending of the term critical security studies is meant to imply more an orientation toward 
the discipline [of security studies] than a precise theoretical label … If the objective (or at least 
the outcome) of much scholarship in security studies has been to render the question and 
problem of security apolitical and largely static, critical theory takes the question of change as 
its foundation, in both an explanatory and an evaluative sense (1997:xii).  
This also conforms to the argument made by Nunes (2014:61) that “the health-security nexus 
is not a natural state of affairs (according to which diseases are threats ‘out there in the 
world’) but rather a particular interpretation of physical phenomena, events, and conditions” 
or in other words “health security is not a fact of life, but rather a process through which 
disease is defined as a problem – a process that involves interaction, negotiation, and 
sometimes struggle between actors.”  
3.3.2. Dominant narratives of health in IR 
The manners in which health issues have been incorporated into IR thus reflect certain 
dominant narratives. These narratives emphasise “certain types of risks, the interests of 
certain population groups, the way in which the global nature of the problem is defined, and 
the need for certain high-level political responses” (McInnes & Lee, 2012:34). Lakoff’s 
framework focuses on two of these narratives.  
In terms of International Relations theory, the classical conceptualisation of security 
propagated by realists and neorealist holds that national security interests are fixed, focussed 
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on threats that originate from outside the boundaries of the sovereign state and are 
traditionally military in nature (refer to the work of Morgenthau 1948; Waltz 1954, 1979; 
Walt 1991). According to these traditional theories of IR the primary raison d’être of states 
are self-preservation (Brown & Stoeva, 2014:306). As discussed in chapter 2, critical scholars 
in the 1990s, chief among which the Copenhagen School’s securitisation theory framework, 
expanded the range of plausible threats to state security to include political, societal, 
economic and ecological factors. This mode of analysis remains state-centric as the referent 
object of security is still the nation state. Most of the literature on health security is written 
within this state-centric conceptualisation of security (Lee & McInnes 2003; Ingram 2004; 
Aldis 2008; Rushton 2011). This also forms the theoretical foundation for Lakoff's regime of 
global health security. These approaches still rely heavily on traditional understandings of 
what constitutes a threat and how threats should be conceptualised. From this point of view 
health problems are portrayed as threats equivalent “to a foreign enemy that must be 
vanquished or contained” (Davies, 2010b:1176).  
A further expansion of security theory occurred with the development of human security that 
takes the individual as the referent object of security. Scholars working from the basis of the 
human security framework, argue that security has real meaning for individuals (Curley & 
Thomas, 2004). Security thus becomes concerned with “improving human well-being, 
empowering individuals, and addressing inequalities and marginalisation” (Brown & Stoeva, 
2014:309). Davies nicely sums up the globalist-orientated approach to health security as 
follows: “the globalist approach does not assume that the state is necessarily the most 
significant or legitimate actor for delivering health to individuals. It tends to acknowledge a 
broader variety of health concerns because it is primarily interested in the existing issues that 
affect most people rather than the health issues that could affect the security of the state” 
(2010b:1189). The second regime of global health suggested by Lakoff, humanitarian 
biomedicine, can be associated with this globalist developmental stream of thinking 
stemming from human security approaches. 
3.4. Unpacking Lakoff’s framework 
Lakoff uses six categories with which to differentiate between the classical global health 
security approach and the more human security-orientated approach of humanitarian 
biomedicine. These six categories are: the targeted disease (the type of disease threat that is 
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of interest), the source of the pathogenicity6, the organisations and actors that are 
involved, the techno-political intervention (which comes down to the actual form the 
interventions takes), the target of the intervention and the ethical stance taken by actors. 
For a brief summary of these categories refer to Table 1 in chapter 1.  
3.4.1. Lakoff's framework 
3.4.1.1. Targeted disease/Type of threat 
The mainstream discussions of global health security are built on the emerging infectious 
disease narrative that developed in the 1990s within developed states, which identifies 
emerging and re-emerging infectious diseases as a security threat to states. The focus is 
largely on the potential threat of certain infectious diseases such as influenza and the impact 
that large scale outbreaks can have on state security, the economy and political stability.  As 
explained by Enemark “the best candidates for securitization are those infectious disease 
threats that inspire particular human dread, and which therefore generate a level of societal 
disruption disproportionate to the mortality and morbidity they pose” (2007:1). This makes 
health security approaches well suited to addressing acute crises of particular health security 
threats, such as bio-weapons and pandemic influenza, but less suited to addressing chronic 
health crises and alleviating the underlying causes of infectious disease (Davies, 
2010b:1175).Health security discussions are thus overwhelmingly focused on addressing the 
symptoms, rather than the causes, of insecurity. They have largely failed to take into account 
underlying determinants of health, in particular complex structural problems like 
environmental degradation, poverty, underdevelopment, access to food and so forth (Brown 
& Stoeva, 2014:310). Davies thus argues with regard to health security that “solutions to 
health crises can potentially divert attention away from the most deadly diseases and their 
causes by drawing attention to only those problems that have ‘headline-grabbing’ qualities” 
(Davies, 2010b:1175). 
 In contrast to this approach, humanitarian biomedicine aims to address the neglected diseases 
that afflict developing states. This approach centres on to the fact that security challenges are 
posed by a great variety of conditions of ill-health. The focus of the existing health security 
literature on the threat of trans-border infectious disease is very narrow and leaves out a 
multitude of concerns such as neglected tropical diseases and infectious diseases prevalent in 
                                                 
6 Pathogenicity is defined as: “the ability of a pathogenic agent to produce a disease” (Stedman's Medical 
Dictionary for the Health Professions and Nursing, 2012, s.v. 'pathogenicity') 
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low and middle income countries (Brown & Stoeva, 2014:310). While these diseases often 
create the conditions for pathogens to spread and antibiotic resistance to emerge, they are 
however not as easily securitised (Davies, 2010b:1175). This can be ascribed to the fact that, 
according to Buzan et al.’s theory of securitisation “for issues to be defined as security issues 
they have to meet strictly defined criteria that distinguish them from ‘normal’ politics. They 
have to be staged as existential threats to referent objects by a securitising actor who thereby 
generates endorsement of emergency measures beyond rules that would otherwise bind” 
(Buzan et al., 1998:5). Davies hence argues that infectious diseases are generally the health 
issues that are most likely to constitute an emergency that requires intensive short-term 
intervention by states (2010b:1176).  
A further issue that is identified in terms of health security approaches is that what is 
perceived by one state as a security threat may not be so perceived by other states. For 
example sub-Saharan African and Asian states cope with a number of infectious diseases. 
Asking these states “to securitize one particular disease, is to ask them to adopt new priorities 
that may not fit with their perceived or actual health needs” (Davies, 2010b:1179). There 
could thus be a mismatch between the disease that is securitised and the health problems that 
are actually impacting people’s lives. The field of health security is thus trapped between an 
impetus to elevate health as an existential security threat and the fact that, as presently 
conceived, security might in the end not be a useful approach for framing and 
institutionalising the health problems that confront most of the world’s populace.  
It is also important to keep in mind that all cases of poor health that affect large numbers of 
the world population are not the result of communicable diseases. As pointed out by Davies 
(2010b:1190) “children dying from unclean water, adults dying from chest infections because 
they cannot afford antibiotics, women dying from unsafe abortions, none of these evoke a 
perception of threat that makes states want to embrace changes ‘beyond the normal rules of 
the game’.” It is this gap within health security that humanitarian approaches seek to address.  
3.4.1.2. Source of pathogenicity 
In line with the emerging infectious disease narrative, health security approaches point to 
globalisation and its accompanying social and environmental/ecological transformations as 
the source of the renewed onslaught of infectious diseases (Figuie, 2014:474). Ecological 
changes (such as population growth, the incursion into previously uninhabited areas, rapid 
urbanisation, intensive farming practices and environmental degradation) in recent times 
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brought on a re-emergence of infectious diseases. Compounding this problem is the fact that 
due to increased global mobility these diseases have the potential to spread rapidly and 
globally. The focus is thus on changes “out there” in the environment.  
Humanitarian biomedicine approaches however point to the failure of development and the 
accompanying lack of access to healthcare as the source of the problem. The focus is thus on 
the failings in the global health system itself. Approaches from this point are based on the 
idea that policies and practices should improve conditions in the developing world where the 
developed world becomes something of a benchmark for measurement (McInnes & Lee, 
2012:19). The central idea is thus “the binary divide in the international system between the 
‘haves’ and the ‘have-nots’ and the responsibility of the latter to assist the former” (McInnes 
& Lee, 2012:19). Since the 2000s developmental aid centred on health increased 
substantially, indicating the increased prominence of these ideas. The origins of these funds 
were from traditional sources such as the G8, as well as from a host of new global actors and 
initiatives such as PEPFAR and the Millennium Development Goals (MDG).    
3.4.1.3. Organisations and actors 
Health security focuses on state led organisations as the primary actors in global health. The 
emphasis is thus placed on the role of national and international health agencies in mitigating 
health crises. Brown and Stoeva (2014:309) argue that thinking of health as a cause of 
insecurity has ontological significance. The significance lies in the fact that because health is 
delivered through the existing government-run infrastructure of public health, it means that 
the state is automatically envisioned as the primary centre of authority and the source of 
solutions to a particular crisis. Non-state entities and structures are thus deemed unnecessary 
because states are perceived to have sovereign control over their territories and population 
(Brown & Stoeva, 2014:309). In dealing with disease political authorities will however have 
to work with a wide array of actors, from medical professionals, local authorities and civil 
society organisations to pharmaceutical companies, intergovernmental organisations and 
private foundations. All of these actors can impact on the ability of states to deliver security 
to their citizens. Davies (2010b:1167) similarly points out that as the range of actors that can 
impact on an individual’s health has expanded and the idea of the state as the exclusive or 
primary deliverer of health care has declined. This has led humanitarian biomedicine to focus 
on the impact of non-state organisations and actors as alternative or contributing providers of 
healthcare, both in regular public health provision and in times of crisis.  
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3.4.1.4. Techno-political intervention 
This term refers to the actual actions that are taken to address health risk. The main 
mechanisms of global health security are focused on disease surveillance and containment. 
Interventions are thus aimed at creating systems of global disease surveillance to alert states 
of outbreaks of infectious diseases, building response capacity in states to address outbreaks 
of infectious disease of global concern, as well as putting measures in place to rapidly 
develop biomedical interventions to manage novel pathogens. As mentioned, this process is 
only geared towards certain infectious diseases and thus does not necessarily help build broad 
public health capacity or lead to overall improvements in healthcare delivery in states with 
weak infrastructures (Davies, 2010b:1177). These measures thus only advance health security 
in states that already possess capable health infrastructures. This fact was illustrated in 2007 
when the Indonesian government refused to share samples of H5N1 avian influenza with the 
World Health Organisation’s Global Influenza Surveillance Network (GISN). This network 
collects samples of flu viruses from around the world and uses these samples to determine the 
composition of yearly vaccines (Lakoff, 2010:60). As the country where the most cases of 
avian influenza had been reported, Indonesia was a potential epicentre for a H5N1 outbreak. 
The reason behind Indonesia’s refusal to share virus samples was based “on the discovery 
that an Australian pharmaceutical company had developed a patented vaccine for avian flu 
using an Indonesian strain of the virus, a vaccine that would not be affordable for most 
Indonesians in the event of a deadly pandemic” (Lakoff, 2010:60). So “while Indonesia had 
been delivering virus samples to WHO as part of a collective early warning mechanism, its 
population would not be the beneficiaries of the biomedical response apparatus that had been 
constructed to prepare for a deadly global outbreak” (Lakoff, 2010:60). 
 In contrast to this humanitarian biomedicine provides health aid. This takes the form of 
providing access to essential medicines, as well as promoting drug and vaccine research and 
development in the case of diseases afflicting developing nations, with the aim of alleviating 
the burden of disease. 
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3.4.1.5. Target of intervention 
The target of each of these approaches is in line with the predominant security theories that 
run through most of the discussion on Global Health Governance, on the one hand, the 
traditional notion of state security, and on the other, that of critical human security theory. In 
accordance with human security the globalist-orientated perspective of humanitarian 
biomedicine begins by asking what makes individuals insecure or unhealthy. The target of 
these interventions is thus the individual.  
The statist health security approach challenges this view on the grounds that individuals 
cannot be secure and healthy unless states have the capacity to provide health services 
(Davies, 2010b:1171). From this point of view national security is a precursor to good health. 
Emphasis is thus placed on the state (especially the military, economic and political 
structures) as referent object that can be rendered insecure by health threats such as infectious 
diseases or bioterrorism. The best response to threats from this point of view is thus for 
individual states to develop proficient health security policies, strategies and capacities 
(Davies, 2010b:1176). The target of intervention for health security is thus national public 
health infrastructure.  
Some scholars also point to a midway between these two stances and hold that states play an 
important role in health security but that national security is not the only concern as human 
security is of vital importance as well. States should thus not automatically be prioritised as 
there are a number of potential systems of governance that might better protect the health of 
individuals. As stated by Davies “states are only to be valued if they actually do improve 
people’s lives” (2010b:1171).  
3.4.1.6. Ethical stance  
The ethical stance taken by actors provides the overarching reason for global health 
interventions that transgress national sovereignty. As explained by Brown and Stoeva 
(2014:304) this is often an ethos of security over an ethic of care. Health security can become 
caught up in self-interest as the logic becomes one of preventing ‘external’ problems from 
entering the state’s territory. According to this point of view “assistance should be provided 
to developing states to help ‘fix’ their health infrastructure because it protects the rich West 
and states that are currently ‘secure’ from these pathogens in the long run” (Davies, 
2010b:1177). Peterson (2006:46) however argues that “appealing to the national interest of 
advanced industrialised states like the United States to justify massive commitment to 
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international disease control will likely fail, because the true security implications of 
infectious diseases for the United States remain limited and indirect.” The securitisation 
premise thus “relieves Westerners of any moral obligation to respond to health crises beyond 
their own national borders” (Peterson, 2006:46). Humanitarian biomedicine however makes a 
globalist appeal on the grounds of common humanity; that a truly global health security 
addresses the health concerns of all individuals, not only the affluent. This briefly delineates 
the two arguments on ethics in global health focused on by Lakoff. Global health ethics 
literature forms a substantial subfield within global health research (see for example Ruger, 
2006; Benatar & Brock, 2011). As discussed in the next section, the ethical stance of actors is 
identified as one of the central defining categories within Lakoff’s framework, but due to 
space constraints this paper cannot discuss this in more detail.         
3.4.2. Critique 
 In this section the utility of Lakoff’s framework is reflected on and some salient points not 
touched on by Lakoff but that might prove relevant to the case study of the Ebola outbreak is 
highlighted.   
3.4.2.1. Utility of Lakoff’s framework 
Broadly speaking the utility of the framework suggested by Lakoff lies in its outlining of the 
duality in global health initiatives: (1) approaches centred on national security, and (2) those 
centred more on humanitarian and developmental issues, related to health. It might prove 
useful to identify these ‘regimes’ in practice, as is the aim of this research. Furthermore the 
categories Lakoff identifies with which to differentiate between these two regimes are the 
central points of contention in the main narratives within health security. These categories are 
thus useful in outlining the issues of concern and debate within the literature on health 
security. This is especially relevant in terms of the discussions on what diseases should be the 
focus of health security initiatives, the role of non-state actors in global health, as well as the 
normative issue of the ethical stance taken by actors. The ethical stances that underlie global 
health initiatives might prove especially useful in providing focus on the research problem 
identified in this study: the question of “security for whom and security from what?” The 
ethical stance of actors in global health is important because this informs every other action 
taken, from the reasoning behind it, to the focus of the method, as well as the method used 
during the intervention. There is however a few relevant issues not touched on by Lakoff, 
which is discussed in the next sections. One limitation of Lakoff’s framework is the lack of 
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detail on each of the categories. Lakoff’s framework thus needs to be supplemented with 
other sources for a more detailed discussion. Furthermore, as Lakoff’s (2010) article is still 
relatively recent it has not been cited by many other scholars, the only exception being in the 
field of anthropology were a few authors have utilised the concept of humanitarian 
biomedicine (see for example Redfield, 2012).  
3.4.2.2. Thinking pragmatically 
While the ideal conception of health security should prioritise alleviating the long-term 
causes of ill-health globally, current policies are not geared towards this goal. Current global 
health policies are ad-hoc policies that are described  as being “targeted narrowly to 
infectious diseases, provide weakened security for only a few, and which ultimately leave  a 
vast majority of human beings vulnerable to what in most cases are preventable health risks” 
(Brown & Stoeva, 2014:304-305). Some scholars however suggest that this tension is 
systemic and might thus prove irresolvable. This is due to the fact that the current national 
and international order is intrinsically state-centred, “where domestic and foreign health 
policies prioritise short-term domestic needs over more long-term policies that could deliver 
greater longitudinal benefits to a wider population” (Brown & Stoeva, 2014:304). Thinking 
pragmatically about the issues, the conclusion can be drawn that a radical reworking of the 
global health system, including the role of the state, is unlikely to happen any time soon. 
Davies thus suggests that “change will be incremental, prompting analysts to concentrate on 
the relatively minor reforms that might make marginal improvements” (2010b:1182) and will 
be reached by working within the predominant structures. The conclusion can thus be drawn 
that it is unlikely that a global health regime focussed more on the alleviation of the long-
term global disease burden, will become a dominant consideration in health security. The 
most pragmatic approach would thus be to focus on the incorporation of these concerns in 
some way in the current Global Health Governance system and structures.  
3.4.2.3. The unsavoury matter of money 
A further consideration is the question of who controls agenda-setting in global health. The 
reality is that the agenda is controlled by finances. The WHO, historically the biggest actor in 
global health, had a budget of US$5 million in 1949, its first year of operation. By 2009 the 
WHO budget topped US$4.227 billion, this sum has however been shrinking since then in 
reaction to the effects of the global economic recession and calls for the organisation to 
undertake significant reforms (Youde, 2014a:8).  During the 2014-15 period the WHO budget 
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shrank to US$3.977 billion. This is a trend in global health funding in general, with funding 
stagnating since the global economic recession. The Institute for Health Metrics and 
Evaluation (IHME) states that “since 2010 global health funding has entered a ‘no-growth’ 
phase, were funding has plateaued or declined” (Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation, 
2013:16-18). Global health funding dropped from US$28.2 billion in 2010 to US$27.4 billion 
in 2011 (Youde, 2014a:14).  
A major issue related to finance is the fact that the WHO does not have full discretionary 
control over its budget; with member-states allocating funds for certain projects. The WHO 
receives two types of funds: regular budgetary funds and extra-budgetary funds. Regular 
budgetary funds support the WHO’s basic organisational cost, annual health programmes and 
selected research programmes. Each member state contributes regular budgetary funds in 
accordance with the size of its economy, and the WHA decides how these funds are 
allocated. The largest portion of the WHO’s budget comes from extra-budgetary funds, which 
are entirely voluntary contributions from member-states designated for specific projects. 
Since member-states choose how and whether to allocate extra-budgetary funds, the WHO 
has almost no control over them. For the 2014-2015 budget cycle extra-budgetary funds 
totalled 77 percent (US$3.048 billion) of the organisation’s total funding (Youde, 2014a:9). 
The rise of extra-budgetary funds has “raised concern about undue influence on the WHO’s 
policy agenda, distorted and disproportionate funding in certain areas, and the inability for 
the WHO to engage in long-range planning” (Youde, 2014a:9). 
The WHO is however not the only actor on the scene, and shares the Global Health 
Governance space with a number of other intergovernmental, non-governmental, and private 
actors. In the last few years the World Bank has become one of the largest funders of global 
health programmes. Other large funders are UNAIDS, the Global Fund and the Gates 
Foundation. Figure 3-1 illustrates the complicated nature of global health funding. Another 
important trend is the shift towards non-governmental organisations in providing a bigger 
percentage of global health funding than state actors. This indicates the increasing importance 
of non-governmental organisations in Global Health Governance that “places non-state actors 
in an important position within a largely state-based system” (Youde, 2014a:14). 
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Figure 3-1 Flows of Development assistance for health from source to channel to health 
focus area, 2000-2014 
 
(Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation, 2015). 
As is the case with most issues – global health is underfunded. Notwithstanding the growth in 
development assistance since the 1990s, increasing by double digit percentages nearly every 
year, there are severe funding shortfalls. A recent study suggests that the international 
community needed to contribute between US$36 billion to US$45 billion to achieve the 
health goals a set out in the MDGs alone (Carrasco, Coker and Cook, 2013:1). While aid “in 
general fluctuates from year to year based on donors’ economic standing, strategic 
imperatives, and humanitarian impulses”, the fluctuation in global health aid funding leads to 
serious complications (Youde, 2014a:15). Youde argues that decreases in funding can “lead 
to program cuts jeopardising previous successes, put continued treatment in peril, and 
threaten to reverse gains made in the past two decades” (2014a:15). Furthermore the 
“decrease in funding could also imperil the Global Health Governance system’s ability to 
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respond quickly and effectively to new outbreaks… to say nothing of funding existing 
programs” (Youde, 2014a:15). 
3.4.2.4. The politics of fear 
While the Copenhagen School’s analysis explains how securitisation takes place, it does not 
explain why it takes place, in other words what it is that make infectious diseases a credible 
risk to security and allows for securitisation to take place (MacLean, 2008:485). Abraham 
argues that perceptions of risk at the societal level are an important precondition to 
securitising an issue (2011:802). Thus “unless a society is primed to perceive a threat as 
posing an existential risk, it will be difficult to securitize that risk” (Abraham, 2011:802). 
Abraham consequently points to an ‘issue culture’ around emerging infectious diseases 
discourse, which describe these diseases as ‘dreaded risks’ that are seen as threats to security. 
Three determinants are identified by Abraham (2011:803) for an issue culture to gain 
prominence: “the issue needs to have powerful sponsors; it needs to have cultural resonance; 
and the messages need to have a successful fit with media norms and practices.” The 
sponsors of the issue culture are identified as the scientists and commentators warning against 
the dangers of previously unknown viruses propagating the ‘emerging disease worldview’, as 
discussed in chapter 2. The mass media furthermore play an important role in the setting of 
the public agenda, and the infectious disease discourse benefits from prominent media figures 
that are receptive to the message of the emerging disease worldview. Media receptivity to the 
emerging infectious disease message ensures that emerging diseases remain front-page news. 
Lastly, the issue needs to resonate with public concerns. The social and cultural context 
within which the emerging infectious disease world view took root can be understood in the 
context of the anxieties caused by modernisation and globalisation (Abraham, 2011:804-805). 
By the 1990s these anxieties found resonance in popular films, books and other cultural 
products, and viruses captured the public imagination as the new ‘other’, enemy to fear. The 
role the media plays in framing health security threats should thus not be ignored.  
3.4.2.5. Militarisation of humanitarian aid 
Another actor that is not explicitly mentioned in Lakoff’s framework is the military who have 
increasingly been active in global health security initiatives, especially in terms of the 
provision of humanitarian aid. The military’s capacity to rapidly assemble highly trained 
personnel who are experienced in operating in extreme and dangerous conditions is cited as 
one of the factors that make the military well suited to respond to humanitarian crises. Other 
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factors include resources, expertise in logistics, transportation and command and control 
(Lancet, 2014). The military have played a defining role in providing emergency medical 
assistance following natural disasters; recent examples include amongst others the South 
Asian tsunami in 2004 and the earthquake in Haiti in 2010 (Chretien, 2011:3). American and 
other military involvement in the provision of humanitarian aid in conflicts throughout the 
1990s and 2000s, such as in Somalia, Rwanda, Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq, however raised 
concerns over the ‘militarisation of humanitarian aid’. Much of the criticism is focused on the 
military’s poor record of coordination of efforts alongside other civilian agencies, which still 
provide the majority of global humanitarian aid. Humanitarian actors’ broadly agree that 
humanitarian assistance must be provided according to the core principles of: humanity, 
neutrality and impartiality; and some feel that the military is encroaching in ‘humanitarian 
space’ and violating the core principles of humanitarian assistance (Chretien, 2011:6). 
Military forces are perceived as neither neutral nor impartial as they “are deployed with a 
specific security and political agenda” (Chretien, 2011:7).   
An indication of the role of the military, especially the United States military, in Global 
Health Governance is evident in the role played by the American Department of Defence’s 
(DoD) overseas laboratories in addressing vulnerability to emerging infectious diseases 
(Russel, Rubenstein, Burke, Vest, Johns, Sanchez, Meyer, Fukuda & Blazes, 2011:1). The 
DoD has a long history of medical research and development, performed through a network 
of overseas laboratories. The DoD has, as of 2009, five laboratories in operation in Cairo, 
Egypt; Nairobi, Kenya; Bangkok, Thailand; Lima, Peru; and Jakarta, Indonesia. Historically 
the focus of these laboratories was limited to the “research and development of products, 
such as vaccines, antimicrobials or diagnostics, which would benefit the health of DoD forces 
throughout the world” (Russel et al., 2011:1). Since the 1990s a need was recognised for the 
incorporation of global emerging infection surveillance initiatives. The DoD Global 
Emerging Infectious Surveillance and Response System (DoD-GEIS) was thus established. In 
2008 DoD-GEIS became a Division of the Armed Forces Health Surveillance Centre 
(AFHSC-GEIS). As of 2009 AFHSC-GEIS provided direction, funding and oversight, with 
92 countries involved either in terms of active surveillance, capacity-building initiatives or 
participation in training exercises  
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3.5. Conclusion 
 In the emerging disease world view the current public health infrastructure is seen as 
incapable of addressing the threat posed by emerging and re-emerging diseases in a 
globalised world. Two narratives have developed representing diverging views of how this 
problem should be addressed. Global health security approaches are focussed on 
preparedness practices and building capacity for the surveillance and containment of 
potentially catastrophic infectious disease outbreaks. Humanitarian biomedicine however 
advocates developmental efforts to provide adequate health infrastructure to lessen the 
burden of disease in developing countries. Advocates of these approaches argue that the crisis 
is not disease emergence but the political and technical failure that led to the collapse of 
public health infrastructure in the first place. These two differing responses to the “crisis of 
nation-state-based systems of public health” form the basis for Lakoff's two regimes of global 
health. These two regimes also correspond to the two main approaches to security studies in 
general, that of traditional state-based security and that of human security, thus linking 
Lakoff’s framework to broader discussions within security studies. Lakoff outlines these two 
regimes by identifying six categories in which the regimes differ from each other. These six 
categories are: the targeted disease, the source of the pathogenicity, organisations and actors, 
the techno-political intervention, the target of the intervention and ethical stance. These six 
categories, within the two regimes suggested by Lakoff, will be used to analyse the case 
study of the 2014-2015 Ebola outbreak in West Africa.   
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Chapter 4: The Ebola outbreak of 2014-15 
4.1. Introduction 
In chapter 3 the framework suggested by Lakoff was discussed in more detail, elaborating on 
the two regimes of Global Health as identified by Lakoff. These two regimes, the dominant 
global health security regime and the more cosmopolitan humanitarian biomedicine regime, 
highlight the complexities of global health initiatives. These complexities lead to difficulties 
in defining Global Health, centrally the question of “security for whom?” Only developed 
Western states? Or all nation states? And “security from what?” Should the focus be only on 
infectious disease that could potentially threaten Western state security or also on addressing 
the ailments afflicting developing states? The answer many scholars come to is that Global 
Health security is primarily focussed on protecting Westerns states from health threats 
originating from outside their borders and not on addressing global health insecurity. The 
research question of this study is whether a broader approach to global health security can be 
identified in practice, not only conceptualised narrowly in terms of health security for 
developed states, but a more truly global health security, and what the implication of such an 
approach would be.  
In chapter 4 Lakoff’s framework is applied to the case study of the Ebola outbreak in West 
Africa in 2014-15. This outbreak typifies a case of the threat that emerging diseases pose to 
both the developed and developing world. It also highlights the relationship between 
developed and developing states in terms of infectious disease outbreaks and the mechanisms 
of Global Health Governance. The Ebola Virus outbreak in question began in Guinea at the 
end of 2013 and spread from there to Liberia and Sierra Leone. There were also several 
isolated cases in other countries. This outbreak was unprecedented in both scale and 
geographic reach, as previous outbreaks were much smaller and mostly limited to rural areas 
were the spread could more easily be controlled. The outbreak reached urban areas and 
spread across borders running ahead of quarantine measures. By September 2015, 15 232 
confirmed cases of Ebola with a total of 11 306 deaths had been reported, making this the 
largest Ebola outbreak on record (CDC, 2015c).  
 In this chapter a brief background to the Ebola Virus in general, and specifically the 2014-15 
outbreak in West Africa, is given. In the rest of the chapter Lakoff’s framework is applied to 
the case study. This is done in terms of the categories identified by Lakoff to differentiate 
between global health security and humanitarian biomedicine: the targeted disease, the 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
50 
 
source of the pathogenicity, the organisations and actors involved, the techno-political 
intervention, the target of the intervention and the ethical stance. Lastly, the utility and 
implications of Lakoff’s framework are analysed. The facts are firstly discussed broadly, in 
terms of the categories identified by Lakoff before the argument is brought together in the 
last section.  
4.2. Ebola Virus Disease  
4.2.1. The history of Ebola 
The Ebola Virus disease, formerly also known as Ebola Haemorrhagic Fever was first 
identified in 1976 during two nearly simultaneous outbreaks in what is today the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo (DRC) and in Uganda. The disease is named after the Ebola River in 
the DRC, which flows near the village of Yambuku were the disease was first discovered. In 
the past outbreaks have occurred in the DRC, Gabon, South Sudan, Ivory Coast, Uganda, 
Republic of the Congo and South Africa (see appendix B for a detailed account of previous 
outbreaks). The current outbreak is the 26th (other sources call it the 25th outbreak) on record 
since it was first identified. This most recent outbreak is considered the most severe and 
devastating outbreak ever recorded, unprecedented both in its scale and impact (CDC, 
2015g). 
Four subtypes of Ebola have been identified: Ebola Sudan, E. Zaire, E. Ivory Coast and E. 
Reston. The origin of the last-mentioned is in Asia, and it affects mainly primates; there has 
never been a reported case of human infection. The other three subtypes are present on the 
African subcontinent and are pathogenic affecting humans. The subtypes differ in terms of 
fatality rates with E. Zaire having a fatality rate of about 80% and E. Sudan a 50% fatality 
rate (Pourrut, Kumulungui, Wittmann, Moussavou, Délicat, Yaba, Nkoghe, Gonzalez & 
Leroy, 2005:1005). Symptoms of Ebola include the following: fever, severe headache, 
muscle pain, weakness, fatigue, diarrhoea, vomiting, abdominal pain and unexplained 
haemorrhage. Symptoms may appear from between 2 to 21 days after exposure. Early 
diagnosis of Ebola is difficult as early symptoms such as fever, are nonspecific to Ebola 
infection. Due to its similarities to other diseases found in these regions, such as malaria, the 
diagnosis is easily missed in the early stages of the disease and it is often only after a failure 
to respond to anti-malarial and/or antibiotic treatment, and also often after others have 
become infected that cases are recognised (Groseth, Feldmann & Strong, 2007:408). 
Hospitals thus often serve as an amplification point for the infection, and health care workers 
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are especially vulnerable. The Ebola virus is only detectable in blood samples taken after the 
onset of symptoms such as fever, which accompanies the rise in circulation of the virus 
within the patient’s body. It may take up to three days after symptoms start for the virus to 
reach detectable levels (CDC, 2015g). The natural reservoir host of the Ebola virus remains 
unknown, researchers however believe that the virus is animal-borne and that bats are the 
most likely reservoir, patients thus become infected through contact with an infected animal, 
which is called a spill over event (CDC, 2015b). The disease is then spread from person to 
person through direct contact, through broken skin or the mucous membranes of the eyes, 
nose or mouth. The virus can also be spread through the blood or bodily fluids of a person 
who is infected with or has died from Ebola. Ebola can also spread through direct contact 
with objects that have been contaminated with infected bodily fluids. Experimental vaccines 
and treatments for Ebola are being developed, but they have not yet been fully tested for 
safety or effectiveness. With no vaccine available, the focus is on continuing to thoroughly 
trace every person that has been in contact with an Ebola patient, to identify and respond to 
new cases early, the isolation and care of patients and on making sure that burials are carried 
out safely. Recovery from Ebola thus depends on good supportive care and the patient’s own 
immune response. Ebola often has a fatality rate upward of 90 percent in humans. People 
who recover from Ebola develop antibodies that last for at least 10 years (CDC, 2015h) and 
the blood of these survivors has been used effectively as a serum in some cases.    
4.2.2. 2014 outbreak 
Figure 4-1 Outbreak Distribution Map 
 
(CDC, 2015d).  
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4.2.2.1. The start of the outbreak 
The 2014 outbreak of Ebola began in Guéckédou, Guinea in December 2013. Patient zero is 
believed to have been a 2-year old boy. By the time Guinea’s Ministry of Health reported the 
outbreak to the WHO in March 2014, it had confirmed 49 cases and 29 deaths in four of 
Guinea’s eight regions (Youde, 2014b).  On 31 March 2014, Médecins Sans Frontières 
(MSF) publicly declared the outbreak as ‘unprecedented’ due to the geographic spread of the 
cases. This declaration was considered exaggerated and alarmist by many. On 1 April, the 
WHO, via its chief spokesperson in Geneva, called into question MSF’s declaration, 
objecting that the virus dynamics were not unlike those of past outbreaks, nor was the 
outbreak unprecedented (MSF, 2015d:6). By April 2014 the disease had spread to the 
bordering parts of Liberia and Sierra Leone, but the number of victims was small. In May 
2014, it started to look as if the outbreak was slowing down. The rates of new cases and 
deaths were smaller and there was some hope that control measures were showing their 
efficacy. Unfortunately, the numbers of new cases and deaths spiked again in June 2014, 
fuelling speculation that control measures had been removed too soon (Youde, 2014b). At the 
end of June 2014 the WHO’s Global Alert and Outbreak Response Network (GOARN) 
organised a meeting in Geneva. At the meeting, MSF insisted on the urgent need to deploy an 
effective response in the region and made a dramatic call for extra support to be sent to 
Liberia. The call for help was heard but no further action was taken (MSF, 2015d:9).  
4.2.2.2. International response  
By August 2014 the total number of confirmed, probable, and suspected cases of Ebola in the 
three worst-affected countries plus Nigeria was 2240, with 1229 deaths, which implies a 
fatality rate of 55% (Briand, Bertherat, Cox, Formenty, Kieny, Myhre, Roth, Shindo & Dye, 
2014:1180). While the WHO had deployed a small number of personnel from early on during 
the onset of the epidemic, the organisation was reluctant to declare a Public Health 
Emergency of International Concern (PHEIC), grading the epidemic as a grade 1, and 
eventually grade 2 emergency (moderate) under the WHO Emergency Response Framework. 
In August 2014, five months after the first cases were reported, the WHO declared the 
epidemic to be a PHEIC. A Public Health Emergency carries immediate consequences for all 
IHR signatories. Several recommendations were made for the four affected countries. These 
included that: “heads of state should declare a national emergency, activate national disaster-
management mechanisms, and establish emergency operations centres” (Briand, Bertherat, 
Cox, Formenty, Kieny, Myhre, Roth, Shindo & Dye, 2014:1180). Furthermore it was advised 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
53 
 
that the movement of people should be reduced; especially in areas of intense transmission 
such as in the border areas between Sierra Leone, Guinea and Liberia. “No international 
travel of infected persons and their contacts are allowed. Funerals and burials should be 
conducted in the presence of fully trained personnel to reduce the risk of spreading the 
infection. Extraordinary measures, such as quarantine should be implemented if necessary” 
(Briand et al., 2014:1180). The declaration of a PHEIC furthermore, unlocks funding and 
activates expert capability faster. Research and the development of an Ebola vaccine was  
thus accelerated in early August 2014, when the WHO confirmed that using Ebola products 
not yet tested on humans was ethical and even encouraged, given the exceptional nature of 
the outbreak. Public and private research sectors thus fast-forwarded the process to start 
clinical trials from what usually takes years to mere months. The WHO furthermore released 
an Ebola Response Roadmap. In September 2014, the UN Security Council (UNSC) adopted 
Resolution 2177 calling the Ebola outbreak a threat to international peace and security, and 
urging UN member states to provide more resources to fight the outbreak. The UN Mission 
for Ebola Emergency Response (UNMEER), the first-ever UN emergency health mission, 
was established on 19 September 2014. In October and November 2014 several countries also 
deployed troops to help contain Ebola and preserve stability in West Africa, among which US 
troops to Liberia, UK troops to Sierra Leone, French troops to Guinea and Chinese troops 
throughout the region (Larson, 2014).  
The epidemic in West Africa has continued to claim lives. An average of 30 people have 
become infected each week in Sierra Leone and Guinea and the outbreak periodically re-
emerges in Liberia. After Liberia was declared Ebola-free on the 9th of May 2015, six new 
cases were confirmed since the end of June 2015 (MSF, 2015a), but it was declared Ebola-
free again on 3 September 2015. For a country or region to be declared Ebola-free there have 
to be no new patients for 42 days (double the incubation period of the virus). A recent WHO 
Situation Report (8 September 2015) states that during  the week of 31 August to 6 
September  there were only two confirmed cases of Ebola; one in Guinea and one in Sierra 
Leone (WHO, 2015a). As of September 2015 there have been 15 232 confirmed cases of 
Ebola with a total of 11 306 deaths (CDC, 2015c). Table 4-1 shows the total case counts of 
the 2014 Ebola outbreak in West Africa and Figure 4-2 indicates the number of reported 
cases in the three worst-hit countries; Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone.  
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Table 4-1 2014 Ebola Outbreak in West Africa - Case Counts7 
(CDC, 2015c). 
Figure 4-2 Reported Cases Graph 
 
(CDC, 2015e).  
                                                 
7 As of September 9 , 2015 
Country Total Cases Laboratory-
Confirmed Cases 
Total Deaths  
Countries with Widespread Transmission 
Guinea 3791 3338 2530 
Sierra Leone  13701 8703 3953 
Countries with Former Widespread Transmission and Current, Established Control 
Measures 
Liberia (as of May 9) 10666 3151 4806 
Liberia (after June 8) 6 6 2 
Previously Affected Countries 
Nigeria 20 19 8 
Senegal 1 1 0 
United States 4 4 1 
Mali 8 7 6 
United Kingdom 1 1 0 
Italy  1 1 0 
Total 28199 15232 11306 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
55 
 
4.2.2.3. The perfect storm  
Peter Piot, one of the co- discovers of Ebola, called the 2014 outbreak a ‘perfect storm’. Piot 
argues that the unprecedented scale of this outbreak can be ascribed to several factors (Piot, 
2014). These factors include a “regional context of decades of civil war, dysfunctional health 
services, strong traditional beliefs amplifying transmission, slow and inadequate national and 
international response and a high population mobility across borders” (Piot, Muyembe & 
Edmunds, 2014:1034).  
The epidemic itself differed from those in the past in the sense that it was not limited to rural, 
isolated communities and therefore threatened to last much longer and affect more people 
than any previous instance. The epidemic’s spread across such a vast geographical area also 
created further difficulty in containing the disease. The problem was not so much the number 
of cases, but that the hotspots were spread out in so many locations which made tracking and 
isolating cases very difficult. The cross-border mobility of the population in the region also 
contributed to the rapid spread of the disease.  
Many observers point to the regional context as an important factor in the rapid spread of this 
Ebola outbreak. All three of the hardest his countries had experienced decades of civil war 
that depleted state capacity, and led to the collapse of public health infrastructure 
(Abramowitz, 2014).  As pointed out by Harman (2014), while the incapability of the health 
systems of these countries to cope with Ebola can be explained by a lack of government 
investment in public health infrastructure or health surveillance structure to identify and 
contain the spread of the disease, that is only one part of the explanation. “Such an 
explanation rests on the presumption that strategic planning and financing for health in West 
African countries is done by the government alone, rather than a myriad of intergovernmental 
organisations, bilateral aid agencies, and non-governmental organisations” (Harman, 2014).  
The identification of specific health goals, such as through the MDGs, and the funding that 
has accompanied them has generated “health silos where vertical or disease-specific 
interventions have been prioritised over horizontal interventions that fund the health system 
more broadly” (Harman, 2014). These health silos distort the normal working of public 
health, clustering funds towards specific diseases, and results in under-funding of other health 
concerns. Harman (2014) thus argues that “while money towards health concerns in Africa 
grew significantly since the 2000s… it is clear that a narrow focus on goals, targets, and 
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performance missed the core to the health of any population: a functioning health system.” 
This neglect is starkly revealed when countries have to respond to a health crisis like Ebola.  
Focus is also placed on the role of traditional beliefs in the spread of the disease, especially 
traditional burial practices in the region. Funerals are known to be a factor in spreading Ebola 
as traditional funerals in the region include the washing and touching of the diseased. The 
corpse is often still highly infectious. Cases have been reported in which the virus has been 
transmitted to mourners at funerals and especially to those involved in preparing the body for 
burial (Richards & Mokuwa, 2014). Many outside sources thus blame victims for their 
irrational customs such as the burial practices; their primitive food habits such as the 
consumption of bush meat; and their hostility towards modern medical practices such as 
relying on traditional medicine and in a few cases physically attacking health workers.  
Lastly the blame for the unprecedented spread is also placed on the slow and inadequate 
national and international response to the outbreak of the disease. The governments of Guinea 
and Sierra Leone were initially very reluctant to recognise the severity of the outbreak, which 
obstructed the early response. This is far from unusual in outbreaks of infectious diseases; 
there is often little political will to immediately sound the alarm for fear of causing public 
panic, disrupting the functioning of the country and driving away visitors and investors 
(MSF, 2015d:8). The international community did not fare any better in their response, with 
the WHO especially receiving much critique regarding the way in which they handled, or in 
fact did not handle, the outbreak.   
4.3. Lakoff’s categories  
Lakoff identifies six categories to delineate the difference between the state focussed 
approaches of global health security and those of humanitarian biomedicine which is more 
concerned with the health insecurity of individuals. As mentioned, one of the limitations of 
Lakoff’s framework is that it does not provide a detailed account of the categories and thus 
needs to be supplemented from other sources. These categories do however correspond to the 
main points of contention in discussions about health security, such as the question of 
security for whom and security from what? These categories can thus prove useful in framing 
a discussion on a broader conceptualisation of health security which includes humanitarian 
concerns as considerations of health security. This broader conceptualisation might bring 
about a form of Global Health Governance that addresses the health security of all states and 
individuals and thus brings it closer to a truly global approach to health governance. A 
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broader conceptualisation could prove more beneficial to developing states that do not 
possess the capacity to address the health security concerns of its citizens without outside 
assistance.  
4.3.1. Targeted diseases - framing the threat 
According to securitisation theory the manner in which issues are presented, in other words 
the language used, is important when constructing a security threat (Buzan et al., 1998:26; 
Elbe, 2006:124). Security threats do not exist independently, but are rather socially 
constructed through language. Attention should thus be paid to the way in which actors talk 
about and address issues, as the way in which a threat is framed reveals the normative 
foundation of interventions, as well as determining the technical approaches taken.   
Global health security approaches are focused on infectious diseases as a threat to state 
security, the economy and political stability. This is in line with the emerging disease 
worldview. The focus is thus placed on preparative measures to strengthen state capacity to 
deal with potential infectious disease outbreaks that could prove detrimental to the state. 
These measures include mechanisms for disease surveillance and containment. In the case of 
the Ebola outbreak of 2014-15 the majority of state-led interventions during the height of the 
outbreak were focused on the containment of the disease in the West African region, as well 
as preventing the global spread of the disease by means of quarantine and travel bans. The 
primary aim of most actors in the response was thus to reduce the transmission of Ebola to 
zero. The objectives identified by UNMEER provide a good summary of how this played out 
in terms of priorities: to stop the outbreak; treat the infected; ensure essential services; 
preserve stability; and prevent further outbreaks. Kahn argues that this “is a solid approach 
that has certainly helped push towards the aim of zero cases, but there is a crucial gap: it fails 
to put the dignity and humanity of the affected community at the centre of the response; fails 
to look at the social and cultural context of the crisis; and fails to look at the humanitarian 
consequences of the outbreak” (2015:12). Foreign states’ interventions in the crisis were 
mainly focused on the protection of their own national interests. This is evident in China’s 
involvement in the crisis with the deputy director-general of the Chinese Centre for Disease 
Control and Prevention explaining the logic behind Chinese deployment of personnel in the 
West African region by stating “that there are now 25,000 Chinese businesses registered in 
Africa and China is the continent’s largest trading partner” (Larson, 2014). This points to the 
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fact that the justification of China’s involvement is the protection of its own national 
economic interest, as well as the protection of its own nationals in the region.  
Health problems, in terms of health security, are often equated to a foreign enemy that must 
be vanquished or contained, thus evoking traditional security language. This is evident in 
discussions on the securitisation of HIV/AIDS, as well as in relation to the ‘war on Ebola’. 
Most notable is the US ‘Ebola surge’. On 16 September 2014 the US announced the 
deployment of 3000 troops to set up command and control, logistics and engineering to 
support civilians working in the region (Cohen & Servick, 2014). The focus was on building 
Ebola Treatment Units to provide more beds for Ebola patients as well as creating isolation 
spaces. Assistance was also provided for the training of health care workers, building an air 
bridge to move people and materiel into West Africa more rapidly, as well as providing 
protective equipment (The White House Press Office, 2014). These troops were not tasked 
with treating the actual people affected by Ebola, but only with helping improve the health 
care capabilities of the region.  President Obama’s announcement of the deployment framed 
the Ebola outbreak as a security issue rather than a public health crisis, stating that “it’s a 
potential threat to global security” (BBC, 2014). Similar rhetoric was used in the UK with the 
Daily Mirror running a story with the headline “UK troops to battle killer epidemic” (Sully, 
2014). By evoking the language of national security, reliance is placed on intelligence, 
surveillance and the military. A notable exception to the general state-based interventions 
during the Ebola outbreak is Cuba’s deployment of nearly 500 professional healthcare 
workers, trained doctors and nurses, to treat African patients who contracted Ebola (Peppe, 
2014). Cuba thus placed actual bodies on the ground in the form of their “army of white 
robes” and not only placed “boots on the ground”, thus addressing the need for medical 
personnel to treat the people infected with Ebola.   
A drawback of these health security approaches are that they are most suited to addressing 
short term, acute crises of particular health security threats and focused on addressing the 
symptoms, rather than the causes of insecurity. Furthermore these mechanisms are mostly 
only activated by headline grabbing health events that inspire human dread and societal 
disruption disproportionate to the actual level of mortality and morbidity posed by the disease 
(Enemark, 2007; Davies, 2010). This can be seen in the media storm around individual cases 
of infection outside of the West African region that propagated the fear that Ebola would 
spread globally, or even mutate and become air borne and thus even more deadly (Cohen & 
Servick, 2014). While the majority of the recorded Ebola cases were reported in Guinea, 
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Liberia and Sierra Leone, a few travel-associated cases were reported elsewhere. Cases in 
Nigeria, Senegal, Mali and the United States highlighted the potential for contagion via 
travellers from Africa. This narrative dominated media portrayals of Ebola (Dionne & Seay, 
2015:6). Although the risk of contracting Ebola outside of West Africa remains almost 
negligible, emotions such as fear, anxiety, and disgust, fanned by media reports and 
combined with gaps in knowledge about the disease serve to support restrictive policies and 
increase prejudice (Casey, 2015:7). Several observers also point out that the international 
intervention only began gearing up after two foreign nationals contracted Ebola (Fauci, 
2014:1084).  
Humanitarian biomedicine approaches, on the other hand, focus on lessening the burden of 
disease in developing countries that lack the public health capacity and infrastructure to 
address both health crises and the regular run of the mill public health activities. This is thus a 
more globalist approach that aims to address the health threats facing the global population, 
irrelevant to nationality, and focusing on existing health issues, not potential threats. The 
actors involved in such interventions are generally non-governmental organisations, like MSF 
who provided assistance since the beginning of the Ebola crisis in Guinea. While MSF’s 
primary focus in the region was the containment of the Ebola outbreak, they simultaneously 
addressed the broader longstanding humanitarian crisis in the region which was aggravated 
by the Ebola outbreak. An example of this focus on broader humanitarian action is the 
provision by MSF of primary health care services that were suspended as a result of Ebola, 
specifically the provision of anti-malarial drugs (MSF, 2014b). The outbreak of Ebola could 
potentially cause a setback in the progress that had been made in controlling malaria, and 
other communicable diseases, in the region (Takahashi, Metcalf, Ferrari, Moss, Truelove, 
Tatem, Grenfell & Lessler, 2015:1240). The reason for this is on the one hand, the collapse of 
health care capability due the massive scale of the Ebola outbreak which overwhelmed health 
care services and the effect this had on health care workers (who were one of the 
demographics most affected by the Ebola outbreak). Furthermore people sick with diseases, 
other than Ebola, avoided hospitals and medical centers for fear of catching Ebola and many 
treatable diseases thus went untreated. Ebola caused a ripple effect, further impairing the 
health security of individuals in these countries and exacerbating the existing health crisis in 
the region. There is thus a need to not only address the short-term crises related to the Ebola 
outbreak, but to address the broader humanitarian concerns in the region as well.    
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4.3.2. Source of pathogenicity 
As mentioned previously the emerging infectious disease narrative holds that health security 
interventions are needed due to the changes brought about by globalisation, and its 
accompanying social and environmental/ecological transformations, that serve as the source 
of the renewed onslaught of infectious diseases. In discussions on how this current Ebola 
outbreak differs from previous outbreak, and why it is so much bigger than previous 
outbreaks a lot of focus is placed on the locus of the epidemic. The initial outbreak occurred 
in an area in Guinea, bordering on both Sierra Leone and Liberia. There is a lot of cross-
border movement in this area amplifying infections. Previous outbreaks primarily occurred in 
rural villages where the disease was easily contained, but in this case the disease spread to 
urban areas, further fanning on the outbreak. The disease was thus helped along by 
urbanisation and development, which strengthened the links that spread the disease from one 
region to the next. The same holds true on the global scale where an infected person can 
travel anywhere in the world in a matter of hours or days, before even showing symptoms 
and thus creating a whole new locus of infection. Furthermore urbanisation and the spread of 
human habitation bring people more and more into contact with animals that serve as 
reservoirs for various zoonotic diseases, as is the case with Ebola and various strains of 
influenza. The point thus holds true that the Ebola Virus did not in itself become more 
virulent, but the changes in the environment around it provided the perfect breeding ground 
for a mass outbreak.  
While changes in the environment contributed greatly to the unprecedented size of the 
outbreak, this is only one aspect of concern, the failure of development and the 
accompanying lack of access to healthcare is another factor. As pointed out by Sandvik 
(2014), the outbreak occurred in “countries with corrupt and ineffective governments, where 
inadequate basic health care, food insecurity and poverty made life difficult long before 
Ebola came along.” The conclusion can thus be reached that the spread of Ebola has little to 
do with the characteristics of the virus and instead with the fact that “over the last couple of 
months, families of sick individuals have tried to care for patients without even the benefits 
of running water or a safe place to dispose of waste; and disinfectant such as chlorine and 
plastic gloves are simply unaffordable for many” (Sandvik, 2014). Observers hence point out 
that if the Ebola outbreak had occurred in a developed state, with strong healthcare capacity 
to treat and isolate the infected, as well as trace contacts to prevent further infections, the 
outbreak would have been contained much more easily. The West African countries in which 
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the outbreak occurred were however almost completely without these capabilities, a fact that 
exacerbated the wider socio-economic consequences of the Ebola outbreak and the resulting 
humanitarian crisis.  Sandvik (2014) summarises these rippling effects: 
Left without access to treatment due to overburdened or abandoned health facilities, many 
succumb to the old scourges of African ill-health, such as malaria and tuberculosis. These 
deaths are not counted in official statistics on Ebola deaths, although they are results of the 
outbreak. Orphaned children are not taken in by their extended family due to fear of 
transmission of the disease. Schools are closed in many areas, with serious consequences for 
development and social stability far into the future. Food shortages are becoming a serious 
problem. 
The wider humanitarian crises caused by the outbreak will not disappear with the disease and 
the only way to address them and prevent future outbreaks of this magnitude is to focus on 
developmental aid on strengthening public health infrastructure in developing countries 
Humanitarian biomedicine has described the Ebola outbreak as an instance of the global 
health system failing, and they are right.  
4.3.3. Organisations and actors 
4.3.3.1. State actors 
Health security focuses on state led organisations as the primary actors in global health. The 
emphasis is thus placed on the role of national and international health agencies in mitigating 
health crises. As seen from the discussion so far it is evident that both national and 
international state actors failed in addressing the Ebola epidemic. The national governments 
of Guinea, Sierra Leone and Liberia did not possess the necessary health security or public 
health capacity to address the outbreak and assistance from the international community was 
essential. The help from international actors was however slow and insufficient. Especially 
the WHO, which is supposed to be the governing body of global health security, received 
scathing reviews on the way it handled the crisis. An independent panel of experts concluded 
that the WHO does not have a robust emergency operations capacity or culture (Garrett, 
2015). Fidler (2015:1888) argues that “the Ebola outbreak revealed countries’ lack of 
political commitment, battered the WHO’s credibility, and weakened the IHR.” Recent 
events have led to an ongoing call for reform within the organisation. The WHO however 
states that its role lies in giving technical advice and assistance, as contained in their Ebola 
Response Roadmap, and not as first responder (Fink, 2014). In the words of WHO director-
general, Margaret Chan: “We are not the first responder … the government has first priority 
to take care of their people and provide health care. WHO is a technical agency” (Nature, 
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2014). This however raises the question of who should be the first responder if states are 
incapable of addressing a global health crisis?  
One group of actors not explicitly mentioned in Lakoff’s framework is the military, as they 
are probably included as part of the state apparatus, but in the case of the Ebola outbreak this 
is an important actor which should be included in the analysis. Military actors have been 
increasingly active in humanitarian assistance in recent years as they can rapidly assemble 
and deploy highly trained personnel who are experienced in operating in extreme and 
dangerous conditions. What is different in this instance is the fact that a humanitarian 
organisation (MSF), which is usually critical of military involvement in humanitarian 
interventions, called for the assistance of military personnel. The call was not for typical 
military assistance in the form of enforcement of quarantine, containment or crowd control. 
Instead they called for the construction of field hospitals with isolation wards, the dispatch of 
trained personnel, the deployment of mobile laboratories to improve diagnostics, and the 
establishment of an air bridge to move personnel and material to and from West Africa (MSF, 
2014a). MSF’s international president, Dr Joanne Liu, made a fervent appeal to the UN 
member states saying that: “Many of the member states here today have invested heavily in 
chemical and biological response. To curb the epidemic, it is imperative that states 
immediately deploy civilian and military assets with expertise in biohazard containment. I 
call upon you to dispatch your disaster response teams, backed by the full weight of your 
logistical capabilities. We cannot cut off the affected countries and hope this epidemic will 
simply burn out. To put out this fire, we must run into the burning building” (MSF, 
2015d:13). This statement both points to the intertwining nature of health security and 
biosecurity initiatives and the importance of capable state capacity in addressing any form of 
health crisis.  
As mentioned the U.S., the UK, France and Chinese headed the call and deployed military 
personnel to the region in October and November 2014. Furthermore the UN established the 
UN Mission for Ebola Emergency Response (UNMEER), the first-ever UN emergency health 
mission in September 2014. As stated previously, the priorities of UNMEER were to stop the 
outbreak, treat the infected, ensure essential services, preserve stability and prevent further 
outbreaks. International state actors did thus respond to the crisis, but as pointed out by Dr 
Joanne Liu, MSF’s international president: “when Ebola became an international security 
threat, and no longer a humanitarian crisis affecting a handful of poor countries in West 
Africa, finally the world began to wake up” (MSF, 2015d:11). This again raises the point that 
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states are more easily moved to respond to health crises if their own security is threatened 
than when the crisis is in a sense more a humanitarian crisis than a health security crisis.   
Another important role played by military actors is in terms of biodefence research and 
development. One major output of US military biodefence R&D into Ebola is the drug 
ZMapp. Several new products currently in use as part of the Ebola response also offer 
examples of medical technologies with military roots. One is the FilmArray BioThreat Panel, 
a rapid-test Ebola screening kit currently used by US military medical staff on deployment in 
West Africa and in US hospitals. Likewise, product testing of a new antiseptic skin product, 
Provodine, is now being deployed by the US army and provided to healthcare workers and 
emergency responders at risk of contracting Ebola in Liberia. Another area of medical 
technology led by US military research are mobile health platforms, called mhealth, which 
utilise networked technologies to track and report health emergencies. Often in the form of 
smartphone applications, mobile health platforms collect, share and manage data for research 
and remote patient management. The Nigerian government has credited mobile health 
technology with helping to contain an Ebola outbreak in Nigeria (Kaplan & Easton-Calabria, 
2015:9).   
4.3.3.2. Non-state actors 
Most aid organisations were also reluctant to take on the perceived risk of working with 
Ebola, fearing that they would not be able to protect their staff. As explained by MSF “Ebola 
provokes an understandable and almost universal fear that is unequalled by any other disease. 
The lack of effective treatment, the painful and distressing symptoms and the high mortality 
rate cause extreme public anxiety, not only in the communities affected, but also among 
healthcare workers themselves, who are often among the first to fall ill, further discouraging 
additional volunteers from coming forward to help” (MSF, 2015d:11). The only notable 
exception is the international non-profit organisation Médecins Sans Frontières, who until 
October 2014 was almost alone in the field (other NGOs mentioned active in the region at the 
beginning of the outbreak are amongst others Samaritan’s Purse, the French Red Cross and 
ALIMA). MSF's activity in West Africa during the Ebola outbreak has been one of their 
biggest ever emergency responses. MSF alone is reported to have cared for 35 per cent of all 
confirmed cases in this outbreak (MSF, 2015c:19). MSF has up to date spent 77 million euros 
in the three worst affected countries (with the majority of the funds raised from private 
supporters and public institutional donors). In previous outbreaks, it was only necessary for 
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MSF to operate one Ebola management centre (EMC) at a time. During this epidemic, they 
set up and managed 15 EMCs and transit centres in the three most-affected countries, 
operating up to eight simultaneously. The largest EMC they had built before this outbreak 
had 40 beds; in this epidemic they established a 250-bed EMC, the biggest ever. While the 
scale of their operations in the region was the biggest to date, it was not nearly big enough. 
The MSF had to turn away people from their EMC. The response was not only limited to 
Guinea, Sierra Leone and Liberia, they also provided assistance in Mali, Senegal, Nigeria as 
well as  during an unrelated outbreak in the Democratic Republic of Congo. To scale up the 
their response capacity MSF furthermore provided Ebola management training to thousands 
of people from within MSF, as well as from national governments, the United Nations and 
from other nongovernment organisations (MSF, 2015c:3).  
Another example that indicates the role played by non-state actors in global health crises is 
the involvement of groupings such as the Ebola Private Sector Mobilisation Group (EPSMG). 
This group was formed the behest of ArcelorMittal, the steel and mining company, and 
includes over 100 companies. It has since August 2014 provided resources to front-line 
responders, advocated for international support, and pledged its members to do all they can to 
remain open for business throughout the Ebola outbreak, as a vote of confidence in the 
affected countries (Kamara, 2015). Other global businesses have also contributed significant 
resources in cash and in kind. While the overall reasoning behind these actions might be self-
preservation of economic interests, the corporate social responsibility of these companies 
provided real help to the people affected by Ebola.  African business leaders also contributed 
individually early on in the crisis. CEOs from many different private sectors also belatedly 
came together under the auspices of the African Union as the African Business Roundtable 
on Ebola, in Addis Ababa in November 2014, where they committed logistical support, in-
kind contributions and over $28 million of initial pledges. The fund, which is managed by the 
African Development Bank, is helping to finance the recent deployment of African 
(ECOWAS) health workers in the Ebola-affected countries (Kamara, 2015). Some of the 
largest contributions to the United Nations Ebola response were not supplied by states but 
private entities. Humanitarian biomedicine’s inclusion of non-state actors is thus increasingly 
relevant as the role played by these actors in global health keeps growing.  
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4.3.4. Techno-political intervention  
This term refers to the actual actions that are taken to address health risks. The main 
mechanisms of global health security are focused on disease surveillance and containment by 
means of global disease surveillance to alert states of outbreaks of infectious diseases, 
building response capacity in states to address outbreaks of infectious diseases of global 
concern, as well as putting measures in place to rapidly develop biomedical interventions to 
manage novel pathogens. The argument is however made that as this process is only geared 
towards certain infectious diseases, it does not necessarily help build broad public health 
capacity or lead to overall improvement in healthcare delivery in states with weak 
infrastructure. These measures thus might only prove to advance health security in states that 
already possess capable health infrastructure to fight off infectious diseases. This point is 
emphasised in the case of the Ebola Virus outbreak.  
After the 2003 SARS outbreak revisions were made to the IHR that were supposed to 
improve responses to global health emergencies. As stated by Belluz and Hoffman (2014) 
“these regulations were meant to make the reporting of outbreaks more transparent and build 
capacity for disease surveillance. Individual countries were supposed to pay to improve their 
disease surveillance and reporting systems, and richer countries were under an international 
legal obligation to support their poorer cousins.” This has thus far not been the case, with 
compliance and implementation spotty, 196 states are parties to the IHR, but many still do 
not possess the requisite core health-system capacities. Many poorer countries are incapable 
of developing strong disease surveillance systems or further health security mechanisms to 
improve response capacity, as many lack even basic health infrastructure. The WHO however 
has no dedicated funds for IHR capacity building, and high-income countries mostly fail to 
meet their obligations to help build health systems (Gostin, 2014:50). 
This is exactly the case with the Ebola outbreak. The importance of disease surveillance and 
response capacity is proved when the rapid response of other West African countries to Ebola 
outbreaks within their borders, especially Senegal and Nigeria (WHO, 2015b) are compared 
to the situation in Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone (this will be discussed in more detail in 
the next section on the target of intervention). Observers point out that a possible solution to 
the failure of detection and response in developing countries is the creation of an international 
contingency fund coupled with a reserve corps of trained staff for rapid emergency response 
(Nature, 2014). The creation of these measures will however be difficult in a global health 
system that is already struggling with insufficient funding.   
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
66 
 
Ultimately the best response capacity is a strong and capable public health system capable of 
dealing with any kind of health emergency. For developing countries this means prioritising 
health in national budgets (where possible) and renewing the focus on preventative public 
health measures, rather than only curative medical care. For developed countries this means 
putting foreign aid into public health systems,  and not only for addressing certain diseases; 
thus building infrastructure coupled with clear coordination mechanisms, preparedness plans 
and lab and surveillance networks (Belluz & Hoffman, 2014). The same principle should be 
applicable to health aid flowing from NGO and other actors. As mentioned earlier, health aid 
has led to so-called health silos where vertical, disease-specific interventions are prioritised 
over horizontal interventions that fund the health system more broadly.  
The approach of humanitarian biomedicine differs from that of global health security in the 
sense that it aims to provide health aid in the form of provision of essential health care, as 
well as promoting drug and vaccine research and development for diseases afflicting 
developing nations with the aim of alleviating the burden of disease. The importance of such 
aid measures was again evident in the role played by MSF during the Ebola epidemic in 
treating patient and providing basic health services where possible.  
 The point where the global health security and humanitarian biomedicine approaches 
converge is in the need for the development of biomedical interventions to address disease. 
They however again differ in their motivation. Global health security focuses on the 
development of biomedical interventions to manage novel pathogens. These medicines are 
often too expensive for developing states to afford and the focus is also only on pathogens 
that are deemed high risk for western states, such as influenza. Humanitarian biomedicine, in 
contrast, promotes drug and vaccine research and development for diseases specifically 
afflicting developing nations in order to alleviate the burden of disease in these countries. 
This difference in approach is evident in the development of Ebola vaccines. The disease has 
been around since the 1970s but was considered an endemic infectious disease that did not 
pose a threat of international spread, as all outbreaks before 2014 were easily contained in 
rural locations. There was thus no impetus for the production of a vaccine for the prevention 
of Ebola infections. As soon as western cases of Ebola infections were reported and the risk 
of international spread of the disease was a real threat, the development of an Ebola vaccine 
was fast tracked. The WHO even approved the use Ebola products not yet tested on humans 
as ethical due to the extent of the crisis. Further criticism was levelled against the way in 
which these vaccines were supplied to Westerners and not to locals (Dionne, 2014).       
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4.3.5. Target of intervention 
The target of intervention is determined by the stance taken in terms of the techno-political 
intervention as discussed above. The techno-political intervention of global health security 
approaches are disease surveillance and response mechanism. The target of the intervention is 
thus national public health infrastructure with a focus on proficient health security policies, 
strategies and capacities. Humanitarian biomedicine on the other hand intervenes to alleviate 
the burden of disease, the target of these interventions is thus the individual.    
As mentioned above, health security mechanisms are focused on disease surveillance and 
containment, which is built on the International Health Regulations. The IHR requires the 
reporting of any public health emergency of international concern (PHEIC) as well as “real-
time dialogue among affected governments and WHO to propose real-time evidence-based 
actions at borders” (Heymann, 2015:1184). Furthermore the IHR also requires states to 
strengthen eight core capacities in public health. These capacities are seen as essential in 
detecting, assessing, notifying and reporting events as well as responding to public health risk 
and emergencies of national/international concern. The IHR thus provides a global 
framework for the enhancement of collective health security. This framework also focusses   
on investment by states and development agencies to strengthen public health in terms of 
infectious disease detection and containment. 
One of the aggravating factors in the recent spread of Ebola was the lack “of trained disease 
detectives, functional laboratories, and quality surveillance data to make timely decisions 
about the use of  resources to prevent, detect, and respond to infectious disease threats” 
within the borders of the hardest hit countries (Tappero, Thomas, Kenyon & Frieden, 
2015:1889). Ebola spread to several more countries including Nigeria, Senegal, Mali, Spain, 
and the USA. The spread was however quickly controlled in these countries. Tappero et al. 
point to the existence of components of Global Health Security Alliance (GHSA) 
mechanisms in these countries as the defining difference, arguing that even nascent capacity 
was crucial in facilitating a timely response. In Nigeria, for example, “a dedicated public 
health emergency operations centre for polio eradication and a cadre of Field Epidemiology 
Training Program8-trained epidemiologists which facilitated the multi-sectoral coordination 
and extensive contact tracing efforts needed to control the outbreak once it spread within 
Lagos, and from Lagos to a second city” (Tappero, Thomas, Kenyon & Frieden, 2015:1889). 
                                                 
8 Field Epidemiology Training Program is a practices-based public health training modelled on the U.S. CDC 
Epidemic Intelligence Service (CDC, 2015a). 
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Nigeria, Senegal and Mali all had the benefit of world-class laboratories which could produce 
fast test results. The experience in all three countries highlights the importance of strong 
surveillance and rapid response at the beginning of an outbreak (MSF, 2015d:12).  
The problem with this approach lies in the fact that while the IHR is aimed at mitigating and 
preventing collective health risk, they do not provide for access to health goods and services 
(Heymann, 2015:1184). The health security of the individual is thus not strengthened per se. 
Youde highlights the issues  related to the IHR focus on surveillance capacity in terms of the 
MERS-CoV disease, stating that the “IHR (2005) compels the development of surveillance 
capabilities even if a state might have other more pressing public health needs and concerns” 
(2014a:14). The result of this might be that “a state could invest in developing the 
surveillance systems necessary to track cases… but it might not be left with sufficient 
resources to develop or maintain the public health infrastructure that can address the cases of 
the new disease” (Youde, 2014a:14).    
Individual health security, the focus of humanitarian biomedicine approaches, is dependent 
on access to vaccines, drugs and health services, all utterly lacking in the three worst hit 
countries. These countries lack essential public health infrastructure, even the most basic 
component of which is adequate health workforces. Even before the outbreak Liberia and 
Sierra Leone had only about 90 and 136 doctors respectively (Gostin, 2014:1), and Guinea 
was only marginally better off with fewer than 1000 doctors for a population of more than 11 
million people, a frightening statistic that has only been made worse by the Ebola outbreak 
with health workers being one of the most vulnerable populations. The latest numbers 
released by the WHO state that a total of 881 health workers have been infected in the region 
since the beginning of the outbreak. Among them, there have been 513 deaths (WHO, 
2015a). The Ebola outbreak will thus also have further long-term impacts on the provision of 
public health in these countries.  Observers argue that the Ebola outbreak in West Africa has 
exposed the limits of the current approach to the global governance of infectious diseases, as 
international efforts to strengthen health security quickly faltered when confronted with the 
weak national health systems of the affected countries (Elbe & Roemer-Mahler, 2015:1).   
It can thus be argued that while disease surveillance and containment is a vital part of global 
health security, more focus should be placed on broader and strong public health 
infrastructure because without it states are incapable of addressing the health problems of 
their citizens, especially communicable diseases. The infectious nature of communicable 
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disease further makes the strengthening of public health infrastructure in developing nations a 
global issue of concern. While the focus of global health security is on addressing health 
issues that transcend the nation state, the national public health system is still the anchoring 
institutions of the global health system.  
4.3.6. Ethical stance 
The ethical stance taken by actors provides the overarching reason for global health 
interventions. The ethical stance is either one of self-protection or one of common humanity, 
the problem is that an ethos of security often wins over an ethic of care, a fact that will not 
surprise realists. The Ebola outbreak once again highlighted the fact that self-protection is a 
better motivator for the activation of global health security mechanisms and the involvement 
of the international community in health crises abroad, than a call on common humanity. The 
primary concern of the international response to the Ebola outbreak was to contain the 
disease and not to alleviate the suffering of the people affected by the disease. The main 
focus of global health security is the security threat posed by disease, but these disease 
outbreaks also create humanitarian crises that need to be addresses as well, especially in the 
context of developing countries. This is a concern not incorporated into the global health 
security framework, which is concerned with the security of the state. Disease is however 
intrinsically linked to people. The question is thus: can Global Health Governance be 
divorced from the people that are infected by the disease?     
While it is argued that “global health touches upon all the core functions of foreign policy: 
achieving security, creating economic wealth, supporting development in low-income 
countries and protecting human dignity” (UN General Assembly, 2009:2), it is the first two 
considerations that often carry the most weight. Hwenda, Mahlathi and Maphanga counter 
this point arguing that “the inherent nature of foreign policy as a function of national interest 
whose primary objective is to protect national security, economic interest and national 
development precludes health foreign policy from serving the altruistic purposes it is alleged 
to serve. Its primary purpose, the pursuit of self-interest, is a goal that potentially undermines 
solutions that respond to the threats of greater relevance to developing countries” (2011:11).  
Global health is underpinned by a variety of collective values, amongst others, economic 
progress, human rights and international development (Davies, Kamradt-Scott & Rushton, 
2015:2). These values differ with regard to their success in ensuring sustained political 
engagement among foreign policy, security and health policy communities. Davies, Kamradt-
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Scott and Ruston (2015:2) argue that the norms that underpin the contemporary global health 
security regime are based on “a set of expectations about how a ‘responsible state’ and a 
‘responsible international community’ should behave in the event of a disease outbreak that 
has the potential to spread across national borders.” Global health in general entails the 
consideration of the health needs of all people above the concerns of particular nations; 
something that transcends the nation state; if global health security mechanisms are only 
activated for self-protection then international health security means that each state is only 
concerned with its own security.  
4.4. Problematising the ‘global’ nature of global health security 
If Fidler’s definition of global public health governance as “the use of formal and informal 
institutions, rules, and processes by states, intergovernmental organizations, and non-state 
actors to deal with challenges to health that require cross-border collective action to address 
effectively” (Fidler, 2010:3) is used to conceptualise Global Health Governance and 
combined with the discussion on the Ebola outbreak in West Africa, several points of 
importance can be drawn.  
Firstly the “formal institutions, rules and processes” of Global Health Governance might not 
be effective in addressing global health insecurity (meaning addressing the health insecurity 
of all populations). As summed up by Brown and Stoeva, current Global Health Governance 
mechanisms are only “targeted narrowly to infectious diseases, provide weakened security for 
only a few, and ultimately leave a vast majority of human beings vulnerable to what in most 
cases are preventable health risks” (2014:304-305). Even just in terms of infectious diseases 
there is a disjuncture between the diseases that are securitised and the actual infectious 
diseases that impact on health security in the developing world.  As mentioned earlier the 
field of health security is thus trapped between an impetus to elevate health as an existential 
security threat and the fact that, as presently conceived, security might in the end not be a 
useful approach for framing and institutionalising the health problems that confront most of 
the world’s populace. This is illustrated by the case study of the Ebola outbreak where a 
disease that was considered to be an endemic African disease, and thus ignored in Global 
Health Governance considerations, became a global health risk. Furthermore the way in 
which the formal institutions, rules and processes of Global Health Governance engaged with 
the Ebola outbreak was focused narrowly on containing the disease and stopping the 
international spread thereof rather than on treating the people infected with the disease and 
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addressing the humanitarian crises caused by the disease outbreak. An important point thus 
highlighted in this chapter is the power asymmetries that exist in the global governance of 
health.  
Hwenda, Mahlathi and Maphanga (2011:11) argue that ensuring global health security for all 
requires a balanced and inclusive agenda. Hwenda et al. thus suggest that developing 
countries should engage more with health security discourse to ensure better representation of 
their national and regional health security concerns (2011:12). They argue that this is the only 
way in which global health security cooperation can translate to positive health outcomes for 
developing states and “prevent the marginalisation of their health security threats, and bring 
the required balance  to the global health security agenda” (Hwenda, Mahlati & Maphanga, 
2011:12-13). The current global health security regime is however still primarily focused on 
the state-centred approach to global health security and not on individual health security. The 
suggestion made by Lakoff that “humanitarian biomedicine could be seen as offering a 
philanthropic palliative to nation-states lacking public health infrastructure in exchange for 
the right of international health organizations to monitor their populations for outbreaks that 
might threaten wealthy nations” (2010:75), could thus be the best option to create a more 
mutually beneficial and truly ‘global’ health security regime that also brings about benefits to 
the citizens of developing states. A broader conceptualisation of health security to include 
humanitarian concerns in considerations of health security is thus a salient point. In the case 
of the Ebola outbreak the more humanitarian-focussed approaches of non-state actors 
represented the majority of the actions that addressed the health insecurity of the individuals 
affected by the disease. In this case non-state actors played a more important role in 
addressing the disease outbreak than state actors.       
A second point that can be made as a result of this discussion is thus the importance of the 
inclusion of non-state actors, and the role they play in Global Health Governance, and in 
discussions on health security. This is especially relevant as the Ebola outbreak revealed the 
lack of a global first responder that could act in the event of an infectious disease outbreak in 
developing countries that lack the capacity to stop the spread of the disease. In the case of the 
Ebola outbreak the burden was carried by non-state actors, who were later joined by foreign 
military forces. While military forces have proved to be effective in humanitarian crisis 
intervention, states mainly only deploy their military forces in cases where there national 
interest is impacted. Non-state actors are thus the most likely first responders in infectious 
disease outbreaks in developing countries.     
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4.5. Conclusion 
In this chapter the Ebola Virus outbreak in West Africa in 2014, the biggest ever recorded,  
which affected up to 15 000 people and has caused 11 306 deaths so far is discussed. The 
discussion was structured by using Lakoff’s framework of two regimes of global health as 
outlined in chapter 3. This Ebola outbreak highlighted several problematic aspects of the 
working of global health initiatives.  Firstly, the slow response of international actors and the 
lack of a formal first responder in the case of a global health emergency in developing states 
that lack the response capacity to address epidemic outbreaks of international concern on 
their own. The Ebola outbreak also indicated the importance of non-state actors in taking up 
the role of first responders and addressing the health security of individuals affected by the 
disease; where the formal Global Health Governance interventions by state actors were more 
focused on containing the disease and thus on protecting their own health security. The 
formal Global Health Governance intervention in this case was thus more focused on self-
protection rather than the ethics of common humanity and an ethic of care. The categories 
identified by Lakoff proved useful in discussing the aims, methods and values of global 
health security initiatives. While the categories focus on the separate aspects of Global Health 
Governance, when combined they provide a useful summary of the aims, methods and values 
of global health security initiatives. The major aim of global health security initiatives in the 
case of the Ebola outbreak was the containment of the disease. This case also illuminated the 
fact that the main methods of global health security initiatives, based on infectious disease 
surveillance and containment, is inadequate without the support of a strong and broad-based 
public health capacity; something that was lacking in the worst hit countries, Guinea, Liberia 
and Sierra Leone. The dominant values that motivated these initiatives were thus mainly 
those of self-protection and not concern for the individuals suffering from the disease. In 
chapter 5 the main points of this study are summarised, the research question is answered and 
suggestions for future research on the topics are made.  
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Chapter 5: Conclusion 
5.1. Introduction 
In this study the development of Global Health Governance, especially in terms of the global 
governance of infectious diseases and the accompanying process of health securitisation, was 
explored. The focus was on the nexus between health (individual and collective), the state 
and security. While international cooperation on health concerns have a long history, the 
current embodiment of global health is relatively novel. The idea of global health security 
gained prominence in the 1990s through the emerging disease world view. Since the 1980s a 
renewed sense of dread about emerging and re-emerging disease was felt, primarily in 
relation to HIV/AIDS. Since then several new chapters have been added to the book on 
infectious disease of global concern, which only increased the prominence of global health 
security initiatives. With each new outbreak Global Health Governance was challenged and 
expanded on. The perception however exists that global health security is not a well-defined 
concept and means different things to different people.     
The aim during this study was to use Lakoff's framework of two regimes of global health 
security to explore how global health security initiatives play out in practice. The research 
problem identified was derived from the contesting meanings and implications of the concept 
of health security, with differing understandings of the precise aims, methods and values that 
are represented by Global Health Governance initiatives. As summed up by Lakoff: 
“different projects of global health imply starkly different understandings of the most salient 
threats facing global populations, of the relevant groups whose health should be protected, 
and of the appropriate justification for health interventions that transgress national 
sovereignty” (2010:59). The specific focus of the research problem is the question raised by 
Rushton on the precise meaning of health security; “security for whom and security from 
what?” (2011:779). This is an especially relevant question to ask in terms of the health 
security of developing states as many analysts point to the fact that health security is mainly 
focussed on the containment of infectious diseases to protect the health security of Western 
states and not on disease prevention. Lakoff's proposition of a second global health regime 
focused on alleviating the burden of disease in developing countries, could thus prove useful 
in the creation of a more 'global' approach to Global Health Governance, meaning a system 
that puts more weight on the health needs of all people than on the concerns of particular 
nations.  
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This study thus investigated the following research question: 
• Can two regimes of global health security, as theorised by Lakoff, be identified in 
practice in the event of an infectious disease outbreak such as the Ebola outbreak of 
2014, and if so what are the implications or utility of a broader approach to global 
health security?  
Sub-questions supporting this primary research question included the following: 
• What are the implications of the development of a more humanitarian orientated 
global health security regime for developing states? 
• Can these two regimes be complementary in practice, as suggested by Lakoff? 
• What does the existence of these two regimes prove with regard to the question 
“security for whom, security from what”? 
This chapter is concluded by a summary of the argument developed throughout each of the 
preceding chapters, answering the research question, and suggesting future avenues of 
research on the topic.   
5.2. Summary of the study 
Chapter 1 comprised a general introduction to the study with an overview of the background 
on the topic of health security. The problem statement was developed, linking up with the 
issue of the contesting conceptualisations of global health security, as well as the research 
question stated. The theoretical background centred on Lakoff’s theory of two regimes of 
global health was demonstrated, followed by a discussion of the methodology and the 
limitations of the study.  
 In chapter 2 there was a further elaboration of the development of the ideational and 
institutional foundations of Global Health Governance, specifically how the link between 
health and security came to be, through the emerging world view. The concept of health 
security has been criticised, with scholars questioning whether securitisation is the best way 
in which to promote health issues, as well as criticising the form that health securitisation 
interventions take. One of the important points highlighted is the relationship between 
collective and individual health security. Several critics argue that collective health security 
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can only be achieved by strengthening individual health security, as individual health security 
is the building block of collective security, and by extension, global health security; and thus 
necessitates global action to provide individuals in all countries with access to essential 
health care. Current Global Health Governance mechanisms are however based on knee-jerk 
crisis response not suited to addressing chronic health crises or alleviating underlying causes 
of infectious disease, such as poverty and poor health care in developing countries. Global 
Health Governance thus only addresses the health security of a few. This short-term focus on 
outbreak containment, and not disease prevention, leaves us vulnerable to the next global 
health crisis. The current national security state-based approach to health security is 
furthermore not suited to alleviating the long-term causes of ill-health globally; hence this 
approach will not lead to truly ‘global’ health security. It is hypothesised that a possible 
solution could be a broader conceptualisation of health security to complement the current 
statist approach with a more humanitarian approach, as suggested by Lakoff.  
 In chapter 3 there is further expansion of the framework suggested by Lakoff. The base of 
Lakoff’s argument is that Global Health is not a unified field. Lakoff thus proposes the 
existence of two regimes within Global Health: global health security and humanitarian 
biomedicine, which combine normative and technical elements to provide a rationale for 
managing infectious disease on a global scale, but rest on very different visions of both the 
social order that is at stake in Global Health and the most appropriate technical means of 
achieving it. Global health security approaches focus on preparedness practices, building 
capacity for the surveillance and the containment of potentially catastrophic infectious 
disease outbreaks. Humanitarian biomedicine however advocates for developmental efforts to 
provide adequate health infrastructure to lessen the burden of disease in developing countries. 
Lakoff furthermore suggests that the juxtaposition between these two regimes can be useful 
in highlighting some of the tensions inherent in many contemporary Global Health initiatives. 
These tensions include questions about what diseases should be the focus of health security, 
who the main actors should be, the form these health interventions should take and what the 
underlying ethical stance should be (one of self-protection or common humanity). The 
categories proposed by Lakoff to differentiate between the two regimes are thus useful in 
outlining the issues of concern and debate within the literature on health security. Lakoff’s 
framework also conforms to the dominant narratives of health in IR, thus linking up with 
theoretical discussions on health security. The traditional conceptualisation of security as 
propagated by realists is focused on state security, and forms the basis of most of the 
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literature on health security. This state-centric conceptualisation of security forms the 
theoretical foundations of the first regime identified by Lakoff – global health security. The 
second regime of global health suggested by Lakoff, humanitarian biomedicine, can be 
associated with this globalist developmental stream of thinking stemming from human 
security approaches. The researcher lastly identified some points not focussed on in Lakoff’s 
framework. Firstly, in practical terms it is unlikely that a global health regime focused more 
on the alleviation of the long-term global disease burden will become a dominant 
consideration in health security. The most pragmatic approach would thus be to focus on the 
incorporation of these concerns in some way in to the current Global Health Governance 
system. Furthermore the importance of certain actors not mentioned explicitly in Lakoff’s 
framework was discussed, amongst which, the media and the military.  
 In chapter 4 Lakoff’s framework is applied to the case study of the Ebola outbreak in West 
Africa in 2014-15. This outbreak was firstly chosen because it is the most recent epidemic 
that warranted global health security intervention. Furthermore it typifies the case of a threat 
that emerging diseases pose to both the developed and the developing world. It also 
highlights the relationship between developed and developing states in terms of infectious 
disease outbreaks and the mechanisms of Global Health Governance. The following points 
were drawn from this discussion: (1) that the formal institutions, rules and processes of 
Global Health Governance might not be effective in addressing global health insecurity 
(meaning addressing the health insecurity of all populations); (2) the importance of the 
inclusion of non-state actors, and the role they play in Global Health Governance, especially 
as first responders in time of crisis. Lastly it was concluded that the categories identified by 
Lakoff prove useful in framing a discussion on the aims, methods and values of global health 
security initiatives. 
5.3. The study’s findings with regards to the research question and sub-
questions 
In terms of Lakoff’s framework, a duality in global health initiatives is present in the case of 
the Ebola outbreak in West Africa. Two differing regimes can definitely be identified in 
Global Health Governance initiatives during the Ebola outbreak. The dominant international 
narrative on the outbreak was focussed more on the state-based approach to global health 
security, but the role of non-state actors, acting in accordance with what Lakoff terms 
humanitarian biomedicine approaches, was an important feature of the international action to 
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address the epidemic. All things considered, the conclusion can be drawn that it is unlikely 
that a global health regime focussed more on the alleviation of the long-term global disease 
burden (in line with the humanitarian biomedicine approach) will become a dominant 
consideration in health security. The reason for this is that an ethos of security has so much 
more political pull than an ethic of care. The most pragmatic approach would thus be to focus 
on the incorporation of these concerns in some way in the current Global Health Governance 
system, as suggested by Lakoff. So while aspects of a broader approach to global health 
security do exist, they are not the dominant considerations. As currently conceptualised, 
global health security is narrowly focused on the health security of a few, and thus not truly 
global health security. One of the central points made throughout the study is the 
problematisation of the global nature of Global Health Governance.  
Global health should imply the consideration of the health needs of all people above the 
concerns of particular nations. This is however not the case. The current Global Health 
Governance mechanisms are not much more than knee-jerk crisis responses that are not 
suited to addressing chronic health crises or alleviating the underlying causes of infectious 
diseases, such as poverty and poor healthcare in developing countries. The conclusion can 
thus be drawn that the current global health security regime is not sufficient to address the 
health security of developed, as well as developing states. The main reason for this is that 
developing states lack the public health capacity to address health crises, and global health 
security’s emphasis on disease surveillance and containment capacity does little to remedy 
this situation. More emphasis should thus be placed on strengthening broad-based public 
health capacity. In the current configuration of Global Health Governance a more 
humanitarian-orientated global health security regime can have more beneficial implications 
for addressing the health security of developing states and addressing human suffering in 
these countries.  
In practical terms, Lakoff’s suggestion of humanitarian biomedicine as complementary to 
global health security is the most feasible alternative to the current approach. Humanitarian 
approaches can be useful in addressing the issues left out of global health security, most 
importantly aspects of disease prevention.  
Lastly, in terms of Rushton’s question about health security meaning “security for whom and 
security from what?” Lakoff’s framework provides several salient answers. The dominant 
global health security regime is focused on keeping Western states safe from infectious 
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diseases originating elsewhere. This state-based approach to global health security is thus not 
geared towards the protections of the health security of all individuals regardless of their 
nationality. This is however not the only regime active in Global Health Governance. There 
are actors operating according to the principles of common humanity, addressing the 
developmental, human and health security concerns of individuals in developing states, thus 
supplementing global health security approaches. If humanity as a whole wants to make any 
substantial attempt at addressing emerging and re-emerging infectious diseases, the current 
reactive approach will have to be replaced by a more proactive approach targeting the cause 
of these diseases. Health security is not only dependant on state security, but also on human 
security and developmental issues.  
5.4. Recommendations for future research  
As pointed out in Chapter 1, this study is limited in the sense that it only focused on one case 
study. An obvious recommendation for future research would thus be to apply Lakoff's 
framework to more cases of global epidemics to provide a more comprehensive analysis of 
the utility of Lakoff's framework and the points drawn from it in this study. Global Health 
Governance is furthermore also constantly changing to respond to the changing global 
environment. The issues identified in this study and the solutions proffered are thus also in 
constant flux. Each new global epidemic brings new tests and lessons to Global Health 
Governance, this was the case with the SARS outbreak in 2003 and the H1N1 outbreak in 
2009, and the same might thus prove true for the current Ebola outbreak. An interesting study 
will thus be to explore the changes brought about by the Ebola outbreak in Global Health 
Governance mechanisms. The Ebola outbreak, and the international response to it, raised 
various questions of the effectiveness of Global Health Governance and the role of the WHO 
main governing body. Several calls were made regarding the need to restructure the WHO if 
it is to play its role in Global Health Governance effectively.  
In terms of Lakoff’s framework further research is needed on the importance of ethics in 
global health, as this research identified it as one of the defining characteristics of Lakoff’s 
framework. Another interesting point highlighted in this research, that merits further study, is 
the role played by the military and non-state actors in addressing global health security crises. 
While the role of non-state actors is now better recognised, the military as actor in health 
security crises has not been studied. This is an especially relevant research topic.   
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Lastly, while the health security implications of the Ebola outbreak on the individual in 
general  was discussed in this study, a further level of analysis can be added by focussing on 
the effects of Ebola on women and children specifically, as they are the most vulnerable 
individuals, thus potentially even more heavily affected by the outbreak. Women especially 
are much more susceptible to infection as they play the primary role of caregivers to the ill. 
The gendered effects of Ebola are thus also a salient avenue for future research.  
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Appendix B 
Known Cases and Outbreaks of Ebola Virus Disease, in Reverse Chronological Order* 
Year(s) Country Ebola 
subtype 
Reported 
number 
of human 
cases 
Reported 
number 
(%) of 
deaths 
among 
cases 
Situation 
August-
November 
2014 
Democratic 
Republic of 
the Congo 
Ebola 
virus 
66 49 (74%) Outbreak occurred in 
multiple villages in the 
Democratic Republic of 
the Congo. The outbreak 
was unrelated to the 
outbreak of Ebola in West 
Africa. 
March 
2014-
Present 
Multiple 
countries 
Ebola 
virus 
28200 11306 Ongoing outbreak across 
multiple countries in 
West Africa. Number of 
patients is constantly 
evolving due to the 
ongoing investigation.  
November 
2012-
January 
2013 
Uganda Sudan 
virus 
6* 3* (50%) Outbreak occurred in the 
Luwero District. CDC 
assisted the Ministry of 
Health in the 
epidemiologic and 
diagnostic aspects of the 
outbreak. Testing of 
samples by CDC's Viral 
Special Pathogens Branch 
occurred at UVRI in 
Entebbe.  
June-
November 
2012 
Democratic 
Republic of 
the Congo 
Bundibu
gyo 
virus 
36* 13* 
(36.1%) 
Outbreak occurred in 
DRC’s Province 
Orientale. Laboratory 
support was provided 
through CDC and the 
Public Health Agency of 
Canada (PHAC)’s field 
laboratory in Isiro, as well 
as through the 
CDC/UVRI lab in 
Uganda. The outbreak in 
DRC had no 
epidemiologic link to the 
near contemporaneous 
Ebola outbreak in the 
Kibaale district of 
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Uganda.  
June-
October 
2012 
Uganda Sudan 
virus 
11* 4* 
(36.4%) 
Outbreak occurred in the 
Kibaale District of 
Uganda. Laboratory tests 
of blood samples were 
conducted by the UVRI 
and the CDC.  
May 2011 Uganda Sudan 
virus 
1 1 (100%) The Uganda Ministry of 
Health informed the 
public a patient with 
suspected Ebola 
Haemorrhagic fever died 
on May 6, 2011 in the 
Luwero district, Uganda. 
The quick diagnosis from 
a blood sample of Ebola 
virus was provided by the 
new CDC Viral 
Haemorrhagic Fever 
laboratory installed at the 
Uganda Viral Research 
Institute (UVRI).  
December 
2008-
February 
2009 
Democratic 
Republic of 
the Congo 
Zaire 
virus 
32 15 (47%) Outbreak occurred in the 
Mweka and Luebo health 
zones of the Province of 
Kasai Occidental.  
November 
2008 
Philippines Reston 
virus 
6 
(asympto
matic) 
0 First known occurrence of 
Ebola-Reston in pigs. 
Strain closely similar to 
earlier strains. Six 
workers from the pig farm 
and slaughterhouse 
developed antibodies but 
did not become sick.  
December 
2007-
January 
2008 
Uganda Bundibu
gyo 
virus 
149 37 (25%) Outbreak occurred in 
Bundibugyo District in 
western Uganda. First 
reported occurrence of a 
new strain.  
2007 Democratic 
Republic of 
the Congo 
Zaire 
virus 
264 187 (71%) Outbreak occurred in 
Kasai Occidental 
Province. The outbreak 
was declared over 
November 20. Last 
confirmed case on 
October 4 and last death 
on October 10.  
2004 Russia Zaire 
virus 
1 1 (100%) Laboratory 
contamination.  
2004 Sudan Sudan 17 7 (41%) Outbreak occurred in 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
95 
 
(South 
Sudan) 
virus Yambio county of 
southern Sudan. This 
outbreak was concurrent 
with an outbreak of 
measles in the same area, 
and several suspected 
EHF cases were later 
reclassified as measles 
cases.  
November-
December 
2003 
Republic of 
the Congo 
Zaire 
virus 
35 29 (83%) Outbreak occurred in 
Mbomo and Mbandza 
villages located in 
Mbomo district, Cuvette 
Ouest Département.  
December 
2002-April 
2003 
Republic of 
the Congo 
Zaire 
virus 
143 128 (89%) Outbreak occurred in the 
districts of Mbomo and 
Kéllé in Cuvette Ouest 
Département.  
October 
2001-
March 
2002 
Republic of 
the Congo 
Zaire 
virus 
57 43 (75%) Outbreak occurred over 
the border of Gabon and 
the Republic of the 
Congo. This was the first 
time that Ebola 
haemorrhagic fever was 
reported in the Republic 
of the Congo.  
October 
2001-
March 
2002 
Gabon Zaire 
virus 
65 53 (82%) Outbreak occurred over 
the border of Gabon and 
the Republic of the 
Congo.  
2000-2001 Uganda Sudan 
virus 
425 224 (53%) Occurred in Gulu, 
Masindi, and Mbarara 
districts of Uganda. The 
three most important risks 
associated with Ebola 
virus infection were 
attending funerals of 
Ebola haemorrhagic fever 
case-patients, having 
contact with case-patients 
in one's family, and 
providing medical care to 
Ebola case-patients 
without using adequate 
personal protective 
measures.  
1996 Russia Zaire 
virus 
1 1 (100%) Laboratory contamination  
1996 Philippines Reston 
virus 
0 0 Ebola-Reston virus was 
identified in a monkey 
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export facility in the 
Philippines. No human 
infections were identified.  
1996 USA Reston 
virus 
0 0 Ebola-Reston virus was 
introduced into a 
quarantine facility in 
Texas by monkeys 
imported from the 
Philippines. No human 
infections were identified.  
1996 South 
Africa 
Zaire 
virus 
2 1 (50%) A medical professional 
travelled from Gabon to 
Johannesburg, South 
Africa, after having 
treated Ebola-infected 
patients and having been 
exposed to the virus. He 
was hospitalized, and a 
nurse who took care of 
him became infected and 
died.  
1996-1997 
(July-
January) 
Gabon Zaire 
virus 
60 45 (74%) Occurred in Booué area 
with transport of patients 
to Libreville. Index case-
patient was a hunter who 
lived in a forest camp. 
Disease was spread by 
close contact with 
infected persons. A dead 
chimpanzee found in the 
forest at the time was 
determined to be infected.  
1996 
(January-
April) 
Gabon Zaire 
virus 
37 21 (57%) Occurred in Mayibout 
area. A chimpanzee found 
dead in the forest was 
eaten by people hunting 
for food. Nineteen people 
who were involved in the 
butchery of the animal 
became ill; other cases 
occurred in family 
members.  
1995 Democratic 
Republic of 
the Congo 
(formerly 
Zaire) 
Zaire 
virus 
315 250 (81%) Occurred in Kikwit and 
surrounding area. Traced 
to index case-patient who 
worked in the forest 
adjoining the city. The 
epidemic spread through 
families and hospitals.  
1994 Côte Taï 1 0 Scientist became ill after 
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d'Ivoire 
(Ivory 
Coast) 
Forest 
virus 
conducting an autopsy on 
a wild chimpanzee in the 
Tai Forest. The patient 
was treated in 
Switzerland.  
1994 Gabon Zaire 
virus 
52 31 (60%) Occurred in Mékouka and 
other gold-mining camps 
deep in the rain forest. 
Initially thought to be 
yellow fever; identified as 
Ebola haemorrhagic fever 
in 1995.  
1992 Italy Reston 
virus 
0 0 Ebola-Reston virus was 
introduced into quarantine 
facilities in Sienna by 
monkeys imported from 
the same export facility in 
the Philippines that was 
involved in the episodes 
in the United States. No 
humans were infected.  
1989-1990 Philippines Reston 
virus 
3 
(asympto
matic) 
0 High mortality among 
cynomolgus macaques in 
a primate facility 
responsible for exporting 
animals in the United 
States.  
Three workers in the 
animal facility developed 
antibodies but did not get 
sick.  
1990 USA Reston 
virus 
4 
(asympto
matic) 
0 Ebola-Reston virus was 
introduced once again 
into quarantine facilities 
in Virginia, and Texas by 
monkeys imported from 
the Philippines. Four 
people developed 
antibodies but did not get 
sick.  
1989 USA Reston 
virus 
0 0 Ebola-Reston virus was 
introduced into quarantine 
facilities in Virginia and 
Pennsylvania by monkeys 
imported from the 
Philippines.  
1979 Sudan 
(South 
Sudan) 
Sudan 
virus 
34 22 (65%) Occurred in Nzara, 
Maridi. Recurrent 
outbreak at the same site 
as the 1976 Sudan 
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epidemic.  
1977 Zaire Zaire 
virus 
1 1 (100%) Noted retrospectively in 
the village of Tandala.  
1976 England Sudan 
virus 
1 0 Laboratory infection by 
accidental stick of 
contaminated needle. 
1976 Sudan 
(South 
Sudan) 
Sudan 
virus 
284 151 (53%) Occurred in Nzara, 
Maridi and the 
surrounding area. Disease 
was spread mainly 
through close personal 
contact within hospitals. 
Many medical care 
personnel were infected. 
1976 Zaire 
(Democratic 
Republic of 
the Congo - 
DRC) 
Zaire 
virus 
318 280 (88%) Occurred in Yambuku 
and surrounding area. 
Disease was spread by 
close personal contact and 
by use of contaminated 
needles and syringes in 
hospitals/clinics. This 
outbreak was the first 
recognition of the disease.  
*This table only includes the cases up to the West African outbreak focussed on in this thesis 
*Numbers reflect laboratory confirmed cases only   (CDC, 2015f).  
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
